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Introduction
Over the past 30 years a growing consensus has emerged that price stability is the 
overriding goal of monetary policy. Once this was identified, the crucial question 
was how a central bank should conduct monetary policy to achieve its ultimate 
objective. Different approaches have been adopted in the past by different cen-
tral banks. In the 1990s, after a breakdown in many countries of the relationship 
between monetary aggregates and price movements, inflation targeting emerged 
as the new standard for monetary policy regimes and was adopted by many cen-
tral banks. The Swiss National Bank (SNB) also modified its monetary policy 
strategy during that period. It did not adopt inflation targeting but opted for 
its own strategy. The SNB did not change its main ultimate objective of main-
taining price stability in the medium term, which it had been pursuing since the 
switch to monetary targeting in the early 1970s, although it did make it explicit. 
In order to reach this goal, the SNB developed a forward-looking strategy with 
transparent communication and clear implementation. The cornerstones of the 
new framework for monetary policy are an explicit definition of what the SNB 
regards as price stability, a forecast of inflation over a three-year horizon, and a 
target range for the three-month Swiss franc Libor (3M Libor).
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1 Cf. R (1997, p. 115).
2 Due to a massive appreciation of the Swiss franc, in the fall of 1978 monetary targeting was 
abandoned temporarily and replaced by an exchange rate peg to the D-Mark. At the end of 
1979 it reintroduced a monetary target but switched the monetary aggregate targeted from 
M1 to the monetary base. After failing to hit the intermediate annual monetary target for a 
number of years, the SNB began from 1991 onwards to set a multi-annual target for the sea-
sonally adjusted monetary base.
3 Cf. R (1997; 2007), H (2004), and P (2007) for an assessment of 
monetary targeting pursued by the SNB.
In this paper we look back and reflect on ten years of experience with this 
new strategy. In Section 1 we begin with a brief account of the developments 
which prompted the SNB to adapt its monetary policy strategy. In Section 2 we 
explain its key elements, followed in Section 3 by a comparison with the mon-
etary policy regime commonly referred to as inflation targeting. The next sec-
tion provides a description of the “rule-like” aspects of the strategy. In Section 5 
we present a general account of the strategy’s implementation and in Section 6 
we analyze the tactics pursued in setting interest rates. Section 7 describes some 
monetary policy decisions which had a particularly strong effect on financial 
markets. Then we investigate how the Swiss economy has fared under the new 
monetary policy framework. Section 9 is dedicated to the measures adopted by 
the SNB to secure adequate liquidity after the unfolding of the financial turmoil 
in summer 2007. Next we assess the robustness of the strategy in the financial 
crisis. Afterwards we take up a few questions that have a crucial bearing on key 
aspects of the strategy. Section 12 concludes.
1. The Need for a New Monetary Policy Strategy
Following the collapse of the Bretton Woods system, the SNB modified funda-
mentally its approach to monetary policy. Since 1974, an annual growth target 
for the money supply has substituted the fixed exchange rate as the new anchor 
for the domestic price level. Monetary targeting reflected a firm belief in three 
policy principles, namely: price stability as the ultimate objective; tight control 
of growth in the money stock as a necessary condition to achieve the ultimate 
objective; and the commitment to a policy rule.1 Although it did not explicitly 
state how it defined price stability, the SNB regularly explained to the public the 
assumptions underlying its monetary targets, resulting in an annual implicit CPI 
inflation objective of roughly one percent.
Monetary targeting was pursued – with a brief interlude – until 1999.2 It ena-
bled the SNB to obtain results that can be regarded as generally satisfactory.3 
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The strategy was abandoned because distortions in the demand for base money 
increasingly called into question the suitability of the monetary base as a refer-
ence value, and not because the implicit price stability objective was no longer 
reached. As can be seen in Figure 1, since 1997–1998 it became increasingly dif-
ficult to interpret the signals transmitted by the seasonally adjusted monetary 
base – the intermediate monetary target. Moreover, implementing this policy 
through strict control of the size of banks’ sight deposits with the SNB (an ele-
ment of the monetary base) gave rise to excessive volatility of the overnight rate. 
The switch to a broader monetary aggregate could have been a viable alternative. 
Despite the extensive financial innovation and changes in payment patterns that 
had occurred, broad money supply measures had remained quite stable in Swit-
zerland (Figure 2 and 3).
However, due to its limited controllability, broader money aggregates comply 
less well with the criteria required to act as an effective intermediate target than 
the monetary base. Another drawback of a broad monetary aggregate is that if 
the targets are frequently missed but the policy objective is met, their usefulness 
in signaling the monetary policy stance and as a means of communicating the 
central bank’s intentions are called into question. The central bank’s credibil-
ity and reputation may become tarnished, even if the targeting regime restrains 
inflation in the longer run, as had been the case in Switzerland (Figure 4). The 
credibility problems related with monetary targeting – but eventually also the 
Figure 1: Evolution of the Seasonally-Adjusted Monetary Base
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Figure 2: M2 Velocity
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Figure 3: M3 Velocity
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wish to use a broader set of information variables – compelled the SNB to look 
for a new, more modern approach to conducting its monetary policy.
2. The New Strategy
The new strategy was drawn up during the course of 1999 and came into effect 
in December 1999 when the first monetary policy decision was taken on this 
basis. The strategy switch represented the most important conceptual change 
since the mid-1970s. However, while it brought in important new elements, it 
did not mark a complete break with the past. Rather, it aimed at a certain con-
tinuity in monetary policy to maintain the credibility built up in the past. The 
new strategy was intended to guarantee a transparent monetary policy based on a 
clear procedure. The public was supposed to be able to predict correctly how the 
SNB would act and therefore form expectations for short-term interest rates and 
long-term inflation that are compatible with the SNB’s intended policy. Moreo-
ver the strategy was intended to provide a pragmatic monetary policy framework 
to respond quickly and flexibly to different kinds of shocks.
Figure 4: Core Inflation Measures SNB
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Note: CPI is the consumer-price index, TM15 is the 15 percent trimmed mean, and DFI (Dynamic 
Factor Inflation) is a measure of core inflation which makes use of 450 nominal and real (daily 
and monthly) variables.
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4 Cf. B, H and J (2007) for a detailed discussion of the basic 
principles guiding monetary policy at the SNB.
5 Until April 2004, the SNB was instructed to “regulate the country’s money circulation, to 
facilitate payment transactions and to pursue a credit and monetary policy serving the interests 
of the country as a whole.” What was meant by the “interest of the country as a whole” was 
not explained. In practice the SNB regarded price stability as the principal objective of mon-
etary policy. Since the adoption on 1 May 2004 of the new Federal Act on the Swiss National 
Bank (NBA), the principle of maintaining price stability has become an explicit legal con-
straint (art. 5 para. 1).
6 According to the NBA (art. 5 para. 1) the SNB shall, in ensuring price stability, take due 
account of the development of the economy. In addition, the mandate conferred upon it stip-
ulates in art. 5 para. 2 (a) that it must supply the Swiss franc money market with liquidity.
7 The quarterly assessments of June and December are followed by a press conference.
2.1 Principles
The three principles on which the new monetary policy strategy is grounded 
reflect both SNB experience and economic research findings.4 Firstly, ensuring 
price stability in the medium and long run remains the focus of monetary policy.5 
The price stability objective creates an anchor for long-term inflation expectations 
and a benchmark against which its monetary policy can be measured and held 
accountable. Reaching the overriding goal also broadens the scope for monetary 
policy, allowing the central bank an enhanced risk-taking attitude with the aim 
of stabilizing the business cycle in the medium term and the money market in 
the short term, as required by the law.6
Secondly, given the long and variable time lags between a monetary policy 
impulse and the reaction of the economy and inflation, a clear idea of the trans-
mission channels and greater attention to the future are essential. Since no clear 
consensus on the varying transmission mechanisms exists, a pragmatic approach 
to analysis and forecasting models is required. This implies the continued use of 
various measures, including money aggregates, as indicators of long-term infla-
tion trends.
Thirdly, policy announcements in terms of an operational interest rate target 
effectively inform the general public about the SNB’s intentions. The SNB’s Gov-
erning Board decides on interest rates after an in-depth quarterly assessment of 
the monetary policy situation scheduled for March, June, September and Decem-
ber.7 If circumstances so require, rate adjustments are made between the sched-
uled assessment dates. Decisions taken between the scheduled monetary policy 
meetings have in common that they are not supported by a new inflation fore-
cast, unlike those ensuing from scheduled policy assessments.
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8 Cf. R (2000), R (2003), H (2006), and J and P (2007).
9 From 2000 to 2002 the inflation forecasts were computed and published only semiannually.
10 Cf. P and S (2010) for a survey of the SNB’s forecasting models.
2.2 Three Elements
The main elements of the strategy with which the SNB implements its public 
mandate are threefold.8 The first element is an explicit quantitative definition of 
price stability. The second consists of an inflation forecast over the subsequent 
three years. The third is a range for the 3M Libor as operational target.
After years of experience with an implicit, veiled definition of price stabil-
ity through the money supply targets, the SNB began to define price stability 
explicitly to give the markets and the general public a clear point of reference for 
its medium to long-term policy direction. Price stability is equated with a rise in 
the consumer price index (CPI) of less than 2 percent per annum. The SNB has 
not set an explicit floor to its definition of price stability. Setting a range of 0–2 
percent, for example, would imply a target of 1 percent with an alleged dispersion 
of +/− 1 percentage point. It does not want to give the impression of targeting 
precisely 1 percent inflation all the time. Whether inflation hovers close to 2 per-
cent or below 1 percent over a longer period of time is irrelevant or of minor rel-
evance from an economic point of view. Thus no fine-tuning of inflation in this 
range is intended. We also abstain from using the measurement error of the CPI 
(estimated to be around 0.5 percent) as the lower boundary for the definition of 
price stability. On the one hand, the size of the measurement error is uncertain. 
On the other, the SNB wants to avoid having to modify its definition of price 
stability each time the calculation mode of the CPI, and thus the measurement 
error, is revised. However, as the SNB stated clearly from the outset, persistent 
deflationary developments will be firmly countered.
The second element, a broad-based inflation forecast and factoring in all of the 
relevant information, results from the well-known existence of lags in the trans-
mission of monetary policy impulses. In Switzerland they are up to three years 
because of diverse and sizeable rigidities in the economy. Since 2003 the infla-
tion forecast is published quarterly following the monetary policy assessment.9 It 
serves as the main indicator for monetary policy decisions and as an important 
communication tool. It is a consensual forecast based on a suite of (univariate 
and multivariate) time-series and econometric (semi-structural, structural and 
medium-sized estimated and calibrated DSGE) model predictions,10 a blend of 
other inputs (including monetary indicators), and judgmental adjustments. Being 
a main indicator and not an intermediate target in itself means that monetary 
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11 The inflation forecasts are also conditional on a basic scenario of the world economy adopted 
by the Governing Board and on constant oil price and dollar-euro exchange rate assumptions 
over the forecast horizon.
12 During the financial turmoil in 2008, the reliability of banks’ borrowing costs reported in 
the Libor fixing was called into question. Since a bank reveals its refinancing cost through 
the rate contributed in the Libor fixing, banks have possibly been reluctant to contribute a 
rate significantly above the other banks’ rates. However, S (2009) found no evidence 
that the Libor for Swiss francs is significantly distorted because of these signaling issues.
13 Cf. J and P (2007).
policy decisions need not be based (entirely or always) on the inflation forecast. 
The published inflation forecasts are conditional on the assumption that the 
level of the 3M Libor decided at the last monetary policy assessment remains 
unchanged for the whole forecasting period of three years.11 Since the inflation 
forecasts take account of the last interest rate decision, they play a crucial role in 
the communication of possible future interest rate decisions; their shape makes 
it possible for economic agents to infer the probable course of future monetary 
policy. If the inflation forecast indicates a deviation from the range of price stabil-
ity, an adjustment of monetary policy could prove necessary. An inflation forecast 
is only valid until the next quarter, when it is estimated anew based on new data 
and complemented by an updated assessment of risks by the Governing Board.
Policy implementation, the third element, is achieved by determining a target 
range for the 3M Libor. Libor (London Interbank Offered Rate) represents the 
offered rate for unsecured loans between prime banks in the respective currency 
and term. As the rates for interbank loans actually paid are not publicly avail-
able, a fixing process is employed for Libor. In this fixing process, the Libor rates 
are calculated based on a trimmed mean of the designated contributor banks’ 
reported rates. While the long-term monetary stance is communicated with the 
inflation forecast, the target range for the 3M Libor set by the SNB serves as an 
indicator for its intentions in the money market in the short term. Normally, the 
target range has a width of 100 basis points. The SNB also announces which part 
of the target range it is aiming at.12
Such an operational target is unusual in four respects.13 Firstly, the SNB tar-
gets an interest rate that serves as benchmark for the pricing of most Swiss franc 
debt instruments and is therefore directly relevant for economic decisions of firms 
and households. In contrast, most central banks of industrial nations imple-
ment their monetary policies by explicitly or implicitly targeting an overnight 
rate, which only indirectly transmits into the relevant benchmark rates for the 
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14 When the new policy framework was introduced, there was no other established benchmark 
rate for the Swiss franc. At this time the repo market was still developing and large Swiss banks 
tended to dominate the interbank market.
15 In a repurchase agreement (repo) a cash-provider buys a security from the cash-taker and agrees 
to sell it back after a set term for a set price. The difference between the price paid by the cash-
provider and that paid by the cash-taker to repurchase the security, expressed as a percentage, 
is the repo interest rate. To protect the SNB against losses and to ensure equal treatment of 
business partners, collateral eligible for SNB repos are denominated in Swiss francs and for-
eign currencies and must meet certain liquidity and credit-rating criteria. For details on col-
lateral eligible cf. http://snbwebsite.snb.ch/en/mmr/reference/repo_mb22/source.
16 Repo trading began in April 1998, but only in June 1999 did electronic trading substitute 
phone trading.
pricing of debt instruments. Secondly, having a target range rather than a point 
target allows the SNB to respond flexibly to exchange rate shocks without signal-
ing an immediate change in its basic policy orientation. Thirdly, the choice of a 
three-month rate allows the SNB to stabilize the monetary policy stance in case 
of shocks to the risk premium in the money market. By lowering its repo rate, 
usually the one-week rate, the SNB can hold the Libor constant and thus com-
pensate for a rise in the risk premium. Fourthly, the target refers to an interest 
rate that is set outside the Swiss market.14 Having the reference rate set outside 
the own jurisdiction is not regarded as a problem. Since the Libor is the most 
important reference rate in the Swiss economy, it is an effective operational target 
which represents the most direct transmission to credit conditions in the econ-
omy. Experience has shown that the SNB is able to tightly manage the Libor, 
despite it being an offshore rate.
The SNB does not have direct control over the 3M Libor. It attempts to steer 
it by concluding repurchase agreements (repos).15 Repos, whose introduction in 
the Swiss financial market was strongly promoted by the SNB, appeared almost 
simultaneously with its new monetary policy strategy.16 Banks domiciled abroad 
are also eligible to participate in the SNB’s repo operations and a considerable 
amount of allocated reserves go to these foreign institutions. A feature of the 
operational framework is a high level of flexibility in the rate, allotment volume, 
maturity (usually one-week) and frequency (usually daily). The 3M Libor is nor-
mally quite closely linked to very short-maturity rates, especially the overnight 
and the one-week repo rates via the expectations theory of the term structure of 
interest rates (at a given term premium).
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2.3 Qualifications
The strategy fixes the general outline for the conduct of the SNB’ s monetary 
policy. However, it does not provide any guarantee of success by itself. Decisive 
for success is the handling of the many elements within the framework. This 
requires constant work. To ensure a successful implementation of its strategy, 
the SNB has kept expanding and improving its analytical tools by developing 
new models and indicators which constitute the basis for the inflation forecast 
on the one hand and the technical know-how for steering the 3M Libor on the 
other. The result of the learning process in steering the 3M Libor during the first 
few years can be observed in Figure 5, which shows that daily changes in the 
Libor were reduced significantly with growing experience in the management of 
interest rates. The monetary policy strategy entails a self-enforcing mechanism: 
the better the SNB fares with its strategy, the more its credibility grows, and the 
more it increases its leeway for economic stabilization.
Figure 5: Daily Changes in Libor
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17 Although often not modeled explicitly (as, for instance, in S, 1999, p. 625), the infla-
tion target of a typical inflation targeter is, in effect, time dependent.
18 As pointed out by S (2006, p. 6 f.) the central bank may also be concerned about the 
variability of exchange rate changes which would lead to an additional term in the loss func-
tion λ
∆e(et − et−1), with λ∆e denoting the relative weight on exchange rate changes and et the 
(log) exchange rate in period t. As Switzerland is a small open economy, the SNB may indeed 
be concerned about the variability of exchange rates as well. In normal circumstances, the 
parameter λ
∆e is nil. However, in the event of extraordinarily large exchange rate shocks unre-
lated to economic fundamentals, λ
∆e may be positive as the SNB may act against a sudden 
undesirable appreciation of the Swiss franc.
19 Cf., for instance, S (1999) and M (2007). Note that the term “inflation tar-
geting” itself has been defined in different, and in some cases, conflicting ways. Cf. I 
(2004, p. 171, fn. 7). Sometimes every halfway sensible monetary policy framework is called 
“inflation targeting”. This interferes with a serious discussion about differences in monetary 
policy strategies.
3. Differences to Inflation Targeting
In the literature it is common to interpret inflation targeting (IT) as a targeting 
rule with the assignment of a relatively explicit quadratic loss function to be mini-
mized. The intertemporal loss function to be minimized reads as follows
 
t
0
E tL
τ
τ
τ
δ
∞
+
=
∑  (1)
with the period loss function typically given by
 
2 2
0.5 ( *) ( *)t t t t tL y ypi pi λ = − + −   (2)
where Et denotes expectations conditional on information available in period t, δ 
a discount factor, pit an inflation measure in period t, pit* the time-varying infla-
tion target,17 yt log output, yt* log potential output, and λ the weight on variabil-
ity of the output gap relative to variability of inflation.18
Inflation targeting central banks are usually characterized by19
1. an explicit numerical target for inflation, either as a point target or the mid-
point of a target range;
2. a framework for policy decisions which uses an inflation forecast as an inter-
mediate target variable, with a reduced role for intermediate targets such as 
money growth;
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20 Also of importance to the design of the new SNB strategy was the two-pillar system of the 
(then) newly founded European Central Bank (ECB). In common with the latter – and in con-
trast to IT countries – money was allotted a prominent role right from the start. Cf. J, 
P and R (2001).
21 The discount factor is not explicitly stated either, but may come very close to one given the 
reiterated emphasis on the medium term orientation of Swiss monetary policy.
3. the announcement of a clear horizon for achieving the inflation target;
4. the concern about stability of the real economy, which is referred to as flexible 
inflation targeting (boiling down to λ > 0);
5. increased transparency and accountability.
The SNB’s new framework was designed after careful examination of the (IT) 
model, with which it shares some important elements.20 However, the SNB 
did not follow it without modification. In general, its monetary policy strategy 
appears to be more moderate and flexible than the IT model.
The SNB’s mandate is enshrined in the Federal Constitution and specified 
in detail in the National Bank Act (NBA). According to article 99 of the Fed-
eral Constitution the SNB is entrusted, as an independent institution, with the 
conduct of monetary policy in the interests of the country as a whole. The NBA 
(art. 5 para. 1) requires the SNB to ensure price stability and, in so doing, to take 
due account of the development of the economy. This legal mandate can be ana-
lyzed formally, as a first approximation, in terms of an intertemporal loss function 
as introduced above. Based on this common analytical framework, two funda-
mental differences emerge versus countries which refer to their regimes as IT.
Firstly, price stability is defined by the SNB as a ceiling – any non-negative 
inflation rate under 2 percent is acceptable. Hence pi* can be any value within 
the interval [0; 2] percent. This implies that the first term of the loss function, 
(pit − pi*), is not defined at any time.
Secondly, the SNB never made any attempt to fix a time frame for reaching 
the zone of price stability, should inflation surpass the two-percent threshold. 
In other words the value of the parameter λ has never been specified.21 Leaving 
λ unspecified (except for being positive) amounts to leaving open the horizon 
over which price stability is supposed to be met. An unspecified λ parameter is 
tantamount to declaring the inflation forecast the main indicator for monetary 
policy and not an intermediate target in itself, as pointed out in Section 2. Con-
sequently, interest rates will not be reset mechanically if the inflation forecast 
shows a clear violation of the definition of price stability (cf. Section 4). In par-
ticular, in deciding how quickly to move back to price stability after an economic 
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22 Cf. B (2005, p. 28). Australia has no explicit targeting horizon because average inflation 
over an unspecified business cycle is targeted.
23 According to T (2003, p. 6) four conditions should be met for a central bank to be 
considered an IT bank: Price stability – a principal, if not the sole, explicit or implicit goal of 
monetary policy; a numerical target or sequence of targets – to make the goal of price stabil-
ity operational; a time horizon – to reach the inflation target or to return to the target; and 
an evaluation – an approach for ongoing review of whether the inflation target will be or has 
been met. Concerning the third element, T indicates that “most of the inflation tar-
geting central banks have a reasonably precisely specified time horizon over which the target 
or targets are to be met” (pp. 6 f.).
shock, the SNB will always take into account the consequences of its actions for 
near-term economic and financial stability. The only binding constraint for the 
SNB is given by the obligation to maintain price stability in the “medium term”, 
giving it adequate scope for stabilizing the real economy in addition to stabilizing 
inflation while leaving open the meaning of the “medium term”. Moreover, no 
escape clause is defined ex ante, nor is any reaction to large deviations from the 
price stability definition specified – through, for instance, an open letter.
A survey encompassing eight “rich country” central banks practicing IT 
showed that seven of them either have an explicit horizon for achieving the 
target or present an explicit horizon when inflation has clearly deviated from the 
target.22 The same conclusion can be drawn from T’s (2003) definition of 
IT comprising four elements.23
A less formal comparison gives rise to additional nuances separating the SNB’s 
framework from the IT model. To start with, the SNB had not experienced high 
inflation periods comparable to those countries which were in the vanguard of 
the adoption of explicit inflation targets. When the SNB modified its strategy 
it aimed at preserving continuity in monetary policy. IT countries, by contrast, 
had to overhaul their institutional structures in order to signal a significant 
change in the way in which policy will be conducted in the future to create cred-
ibility from scratch. C and S (2006) refer to a group of five central 
banks that are highly credible (and make a less clear commitment to an infla-
tion target) as having an “implicit price stability anchor”. One distinguishing 
feature of this group of countries, which includes Switzerland, is a highly suc-
cessful inflation record.
The fact that the new monetary policy regime was introduced in a period of 
price stability and not as a device to reach it entails that the SNB’s policy objec-
tive – a rise in the CPI of less than 2 percent per annum – remains in place for 
long periods. A quantitative definition of price stability is not time-dependent and 
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24 In this connection K (2008) points out that the term “inflation targeting” is outdated 
once price stability has been achieved. Setting yearly inflation targets only makes sense when 
the initial conditions include a high rate of inflation with the intention to lower it.
25 The SNB can thus be described as enjoying instrument independence and strong goal inde-
pendence, cf. B, F and J (2007).
26 Art. 6 of the NBA defines the notion of the SNB’s independence as follows: “In fulfilling its 
monetary tasks according to article 5, … the National Bank and the members of the Bank’s 
bodies shall not be permitted to seek or accept instructions either from the Federal Council 
or from the Federal Assembly or any other body.”
27 In B’s (2005, p. 23) account of eight industrialized central banks pursuing IT, six have 
their targets set either by the government or in consultation with it.
28 F and H (2004) show that a fixed horizon is inappropriate for most circum-
stances.
29 Cf., for instance, K (1997). K (2004) provides an illuminating discussion and 
clarification of the conflicting definitions of the term “policy rule” in the literature and S-
 (1999) a survey and discussion of inflation targeting in the context of monetary policy 
rules.
by its very nature valid for an extended period.24 It emphasizes that the objective 
is a long-term one. Economic agents can make decisions with confidence about 
the average inflation rate over a long horizon.
Moreover, unlike several countries which have adopted formal inflation tar-
gets, the SNB itself – not the government and without consultation with the 
government – defines, by virtue of its statutory and constitutional mandate, the 
meaning of price stability.25 It is impossible for the Federal Council or Parlia-
ment to be swayed by political or other reasons to set an inflation target.26 Any 
modification to the definition of price stability would have to be rationalized 
and communicated by the SNB exclusively on economic grounds. The latter is 
conceivably easier and more transparent than an adaptation of the target rate for 
short-term political reasons.27
4. Rule-Like Behavior in Practice
The related moot question that naturally arises is whether the lack of a precise 
time horizon in the SNB’s strategy implies too much discretion in the conduct 
of monetary policy. We think not.28 As is well known from the academic lit-
erature, neither rules nor discretion are optimal in their pure form. The theo-
retically optimal strategy is a state-contingent “rule”, which allows flexibility in 
responding to economic shocks while retaining a credible pledge to price stabil-
ity.29 The SNB’s attempt to approximate the optimal state-contingent policy rule 
is reflected in a “rule-like” or, equivalently, “constrained discretion” behavior. 
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Like under monetary targeting, the SNB is committed, as far as possible, to an 
“activist policy rule”. The latter consists in setting the policy instrument(s) in a 
well-chosen course of action consistently over time. Such behavior comes close 
to what the academic literature refers to as an ongoing process involving a firm 
commitment to an overarching long-term objective, excluding period-by-period 
(“discretionary”) optimization of a short-term loss function. The “rule“ is not 
designed to be optimal with respect to any single model of the economy, but rep-
resents a compromise that generally performs reasonably well with the portfolio 
of forecasting models used by the SNB. Neither does the “rule” force the SNB to 
be mechanical in its conduct of monetary policy, as in following closely a fixed 
rule. Rather it provides the Governing Board with the possibility of making use 
of the necessary flexibility of action.
The “rule” itself has remained effective over the past decade, since the SNB’s 
perception about how the Swiss economy works has not changed. In essence, it is 
communicated by the regular publication of inflation forecasts. It basically states 
that, should inflation threaten to persistently exceed 2 percent in an unspecified 
future period, a monetary policy tightening should be considered. Conversely, 
monetary policy should tend towards relaxation if there is a threat of deflation. 
However, given that the lags in the transmission process in Switzerland are not 
only long (up to three years) but also quite variable, it is not only the final fore-
cast value or the form of the inflation forecast at the end of horizon which mat-
ters for the interest rate decision of the SNB. Experience shows that, being a main 
indicator and not a target, it is rather the whole inflation forecast profile over the 
following three years and the accompanying communication that conveys infor-
mation on the underlying inflationary pressure expected in the future. Hence, 
in general, if a forecast at a given interest rate level showed a sustained deviation 
from price stability, the SNB would not react mechanically.
As can be inferred from Table 1 (cf. Appendix), 16 out of 34 published infla-
tion forecasts exhibited a final value below two percent, two had a value of exactly 
two percent and 16 ended with more than two percent after three years. Most 
endpoint forecasts changed from quarter to quarter (q-o-q), regardless of whether 
the underlying fixed interest rate assumption had changed or not. Most of the 
time the changes in the endpoint values were concentrated on the interval [−30 
bp; +30 bp]. Moreover, 14 forecast values were above and 14 below the endpoint 
value of the preceding forecast. The highest q-o-q downgrade arose in the fourth 
quarter of 2008 (−70 basis points) whereas the strongest upgrade cropped up in 
the third quarter of 2009 (+160 basis points). The reasons for the exceptionally 
large change in the slope of the curve towards the end of the three-year horizon in 
the third quarter 2009 were manifold – a substantial improvement in the global 
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30 The complete set of inflation forecasts published by the SNB is reported in appendix I.
economic outlook, upward revision of past Swiss growth rates, and a significant 
increase of liquidity in the economy.
Table 2 and 3 do indeed show that the SNB has not reacted mechanically in 
the last 10 years. Table 2 summarizes the interest rate decisions and the end-
point of the respective current inflation forecasts.30 In seven cases an interest rate 
hike coincided with an inflation forecast overshooting the two percent ceiling at 
the end of the forecasting period. On the other hand, in four instances interest 
rate increases went hand in hand with a long-term forecast lying below two per-
cent. By contrast, in nine instances interest rates remained unchanged although 
the forecast implied a violation of price stability in the longer term. And in two 
cases even an interest rate cut was implemented although the forecast suggested 
inflationary pressure down the road. In one third of rate decisions the reference 
rate remained unchanged or was lowered when the forecast endpoint was below 
2 percent.
Table 2: Interest Rate Decisions and Current Final Inflation Forecast Value
Change in target range for 3M Libor  
in t based on current inflation forecast
Inflationt + 12k ≥ 2% Inflationt + 12k < 2%
Increase 7 4
No change 9 6
Reduction 2 5
Note: k refers to the forecast horizon in quarters.
A similar picture emerges from Table 3, which deploys the policy actions linked 
to the last quarters’ inflation forecast. Eight times the target range was lifted after 
a previous quarter’s inflation forecast had overshot the price stability ceiling. 
Nine times interest rates remained unchanged even though the last forecast had 
exhibited a forecast value above the upper limit three years ahead. In one instance 
rates were cut despite an endpoint of the previous forecast exceeding 2 percent. 
By contrast, rates were raised three times even though the previous forecast was 
below 2 percent at the end of the forecast period. In more than one third of cases 
monetary policy either did not budge or became more expansionary if the previ-
ous quarter signaled price stability at the end of the forecast horizon.
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Table 3: Interest Rate Decisions and Final Inflation Value of Previous Forecast
Change in target range for 3M Libor in 
t based on previous inflation  
forecast (t–1)
Inflation(t − 1) + 12k ≥ 2% Inflation(t − 1) + 12k < 2%
Increase 8 3
No change 9 6
Reduction 1 6
Note: k refers to the forecast horizon in quarters.
To sum up, even if the SNB’s strategy corresponds to neither a strict targeting 
nor a strict instrument rule as put forward by S (1999), it is well defined 
and communicated and cannot be equated with unbounded discretion. It repre-
sents a case of a rule-based or constrained discretion approach to monetary policy 
that boils down to the systematic use of data and information from models and 
indicators in order to consistently achieve the ultimate goal of price stability over 
time. As long as annual inflation is within the range equated by the SNB with 
price stability, other aspects, such as the business cycle or the leeway to take aim 
at additional targets, may come to the fore.
The pragmatic approach pursued by the SNB is also borne out from a theo-
retical point of view. Recent progress in macroeconomic and monetary policy 
research shows that if we augment the New Keynesian model à la W-
S-G, according to which IT represents an optimal monetary policy 
for a central bank, once labor market frictions – real wage rigidity as in B-
 and G (2006; 2008), and search externalities as in F (2009) – or 
financial market frictions – i.e. a financial accelerator as in C, M, 
and R (2007), and C, I, M, and R (2007) – 
are considered, narrowly-defined IT is no longer the optimal monetary policy 
framework. The pragmatism of the rule-like behavior embodied in the SNB 
strategy appears sensible given that academics and policy-makers still have only 
limited knowledge about the (true) functioning of the economy.
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5. Implementation of Monetary Policy since 2000
The implementation of monetary policy since the beginning of this decade can 
be divided into four phases as a result of a succession of different macroeco-
nomic shocks.
The first phase, from December 1999 to February 2001, was characterized by 
a tightening of the monetary policy reins by 1.75 percentage points from 1.25–
2.25 percent to 3.00–4.00 percent for the 3M Libor target range. The one-week 
repo rate, the main instrument for steering the 3M Libor, was steadily increased 
from 1.1 percent at the beginning of 2000 to 3.40 percent in March 2001. A 
more restrictive policy stance was necessary in view of mounting inflation pres-
sure in 2000 due to a stronger-than-expected growth pickup and a weakening 
of the Swiss franc.
The second phase began in March 2001 and lasted until May 2004. It marked 
a rapid reduction in the targeted range for the 3M Libor from 3.00–4.00 percent 
to an asymmetric target range of 0.00–0.75 percent with a targeted level of 0.25 
percent. The one-week repo rate was gradually cut from 3.40 percent to 0.11 per-
cent and remained at that level, then an all-time low, until the mid-2004 mon-
etary policy assessment. The reasons for this substantial relaxation of monetary 
policy were a series of negative shocks to the global economy, ranging from the 
bursting of the technology bubble in March 2001, the uncertainty following the 
September 11 terrorist attack (9/11), the outbreak of SARS respiratory disease, 
and the start of the Iraq war. Not only was the economic outlook deteriorating 
but the Swiss franc was appreciating because of its historical role as a safe haven 
currency, which was exacerbated by 9/11. This imparted an additional undesired 
restrictive stance to Swiss monetary policy. The relaxation of the policy stance 
was called for to prevent inflation from dropping too strongly.
Once the negative deflationary shock had died down, the SNB began the 
third phase, which lasted from June 2004 until August 2007. The objective of 
the “exit strategy” was to bring interest rates from their extremely low level up to 
levels which ensured price stability in the medium term without choking off eco-
nomic recovery and unsettling the currency market. The strategy chosen implied 
a gradual lifting of the target range from 0.00–0.75 percent to 2.00–3.00 per-
cent, resulting eventually in a targeted 3M Libor of 2.50 percent. Gradualism 
was required by the uncertainty of the economic recovery in Switzerland and the 
risk of currency appreciation. As can be seen from Figure 8, this normalization 
process can be read as a textbook example of an anticipated policy in a perfect 
foresight model, i.e. money market participants fully anticipated the next SNB 
decision on the target range and the corresponding level for the 3M Libor.
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Figure 6: Target Range for 3M-Libor and 1W Repo Rate
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Figure 7: Target Range for 3M-Libor and 1W Repo Rate
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31 In October 2008 the 3M-Libor temporarily exceeded the upper ceiling of its margin of fluc-
tuation (cf. Section 10) for the first time since the new strategy was introduced.
In September 2007 the SNB entered the fourth and most extraordinary and dif-
ficult monetary policy phase since the introduction of its new strategy. The cause 
was the outbreak of the crisis in the US subprime mortgage market and its esca-
lation into a global financial crisis. In response, the SNB took a variety of meas-
ures, partly coordinated with other central banks, in order to calm short-term 
interest rate volatility and to address various types of funding market pressures. 
At the monetary policy assessment of September 2007, after the 3M Libor had 
climbed as high as 2.90 percent, the SNB increased the midpoint of the target 
range from 2.50 percent to around 2.75 percent, but at the same time reduced 
the 1W-repo rate from 2.29 to 2.08 percent with the aim of calming the money 
market. The reverse interest rate change posed a challenge for communication. 
Nevertheless, the SNB succeeded in bringing the 3M Libor rapidly down to 2.75 
percent. In the first four quarters after the outbreak of the crisis (from Septem-
ber 2007 to September 2008) the SNB maintained its midpoint target at 2.75 
percent. Starting in October 2008, a series of aggressive interest rate cuts coun-
teracted upward pressure on the Libor due to an enormous increase in demand 
for Swiss franc liquidity (at home and abroad) and brought the targeted level for 
the 3M Libor down to a targeted value of 0.50 percent by December 2008.31 At 
Figure 8: Target Range for 3M-Libor and 1W Repo Rate
Aimed level Target range M-Libor W Repo rate
   
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
%
Ten Years’ Experience with the Swiss National Bank’s Monetary Policy Strategy 
the monetary policy assessment of mid-March 2009 the SNB decided a further 
reduction of the target range by 25 basis points, narrowing it to 0.00–0.75 per-
cent with an intended level of approximately 0.25 percent. This level was con-
firmed at the June and September assessments.
Figure 9: Target Range for 3M-Libor
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As in the preceding unscheduled assessments (cf. Section 6) the sharp relaxation 
of the policy stance decided in October and November 2008 was not based on a 
new inflation forecast. Circumstances may arise in which a careful judgment may 
be particularly decisive. An important implicit element of the SNB’s monetary 
policy strategy is the degree of flexibility, which allows the Governing Board to 
react in a swift and timely way to a changing assessment of the situation, taking 
account of a broad range of new information and indicators. In turbulent times, 
like those that followed the deepening of the financial crisis subsequent to the 
collapse of Lehman Brothers in mid-September 2008, forecasting inflation over 
a three-year horizon is particularly challenging. The reason is that model param-
eters are estimated on normal past conditions and regularities in the economy 
and, moreover, do not (yet) incorporate key features of the financial sector suf-
ficiently. Results have thus to be interpreted with particular care.
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6. Evaluation of the SNB’s Tactics in Interest-Rate Setting
Based on a comparison of the SNB’s types of behavior in the four phases distin-
guished in Section 5, some interesting observations emerge that allow us to iden-
tify the main elements characterizing the tactics pursued by the SNB in conduct-
ing monetary policy. One element is a resolute and symmetric response to cyclical 
shocks. Another characteristic is the choice between scheduled and unscheduled 
monetary policy decisions. The next element is a tendency to avoiding policy 
reversals. A further tactical feature is a relatively early interest rate reduction in 
2008 despite a comparably good growth performance of the Swiss economy. The 
last two tactical elements are the way in which oil price movements are taken into 
account in conducting monetary policy, and the setting of the reference interest 
rate in comparison with the Taylor rule.
Before examining and rationalizing the tactical elements emerging from an 
analysis of the four policy phases, we emphasize that policy implementation at 
the beginning is less comparable to the subsequent phases, because the SNB was 
about to pick up first experiences with its new strategy. In order to maintain the 
3M Libor in the middle of the target range, the SNB thwarted upward trend-
ing expectations regarding the 3M Libor in February and again in April/May 
2000 by lowering the repo rate, only to surprise the market shortly afterwards 
by announcing an increase in the target range it was aiming for. For the same 
reason (i.e. keeping the 3M Libor in the middle of the target range), the SNB 
pushed up the repo rate in the first quarter 2001 and lowered the target range in 
March, arguably surprising market participants once more. After these teething 
problems in implementation of its new strategy, the SNB became more flexible 
and accommodated market expectations on the 3M Libor as long as they were 
in line with its policy intentions for the future.
We now turn to a discussion of the tactical characteristics guiding interest rate 
decisions. Firstly, as summarized in Figure 10, the SNB boosted rates quickly 
during the first phase when the target range was raised in just two quarters by 
175 basis points in total. Symmetrically, rates were eased in a small number of 
large cuts, in particular in the current financial crisis. Interest rate cuts during 
the second phase (March 2001 – May 2004) resulted in seven reductions of the 
midpoint target for the 3M Libor of 325 basis points in total. These were spread 
over 12 quarters with – on average – one 27 basis-point interest rate reduction 
per quarter or 46.4 basis points per step. In the fourth phase (particularly since 
October 2008) the target range was reduced in five steps in less than two quarters 
by 250 basis points, which amounts to more than 125 basis points per quarter or 
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32 Cf. the discussion in 11.5.
50 basis points per step. By contrast, the speed of interest rate hikes during the 
third phase (June 2004 – August 2007) was at odds with the steps taken in the 
first phase. Tightening was realized in 10 steps limited to 25 basis points each. 
The rate rise of 250 basis points was realized over 14 quarters, amounting to an 
average interest rate hike of just around 18 basis points each quarter.
Interest-rate setting tactics were dictated by the extent and the nature of eco-
nomic shocks. If a need to tighten policy is ascertained but no shock affects the 
economy, the policy reaction can be gradual, as in the third phase. Indeed, the 
conviction that – assuming long-term inflation expectations are contained – the 
economy could adapt continually to higher interest rates without overheating, and 
the fear that an exchange rate appreciation could undermine the recovery, led to 
a predominately smooth and modest rate-raising process. By contrast, faced with 
shocks, monetary policy may be called to act aggressively. In fact, the decisive rate 
hikes in the first phase were required because of an unexpected growth momen-
tum and weakness of the Swiss franc which exerted upward pressure on prices. 
Similarly, the resolute rate cuts in the second and fourth policy phase were due to 
a fast-mounting risk of deflation in the short run, which could only be alleviated 
through aggressive policy easing, even though such a policy enhances the prob-
ability of arriving at the zero lower bound more rapidly.32 Moreover, by cutting 
Figure 10: SNB Monetary Policy Decisions since 2000
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rates aggressively, the private sector will expect higher inflation in the medium 
term. In turn, medium-term real rates will be lower and boost demand and infla-
tion so that the consequences of the zero lower bound will be less severe. The 
medium-term inflation pressure shown by the SNB’s inflation forecasts in 2003 
and 2004 was, at a time of practically zero short-term interest rates, intended and 
acceptable in a situation fraught with deflationary danger in the short run.
Secondly, rate lifts were, with one exception, decided at scheduled monetary 
policy assessments while 8 out of 12 rate decreases were taken at unscheduled 
assessments.
Figure 11: SNB Monetary Policy Decisions since 2000
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How can the choice between scheduled and unscheduled decisions be explained? 
Generally the SNB tries to avoid surprising market participants because it regards 
the management of expectations as an essential element of its rule-like approach. 
It is widely accepted that the ability of a central bank to affect the economy 
depends critically on its ability to influence market expectations about the future 
path of very short-term interest rates. Accordingly, unscheduled decisions are the 
result of unexpected events, necessitating a prompt reaction to avert the negative 
consequences a postponement of decision to the next scheduled assessment date 
would bring about. For instance, on 3 February 2000 an interim assessment of 
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33 According to B (2006) central banks’ reversal aversion probably contributes signifi-
cantly to gradualism in monetary policymaking. In the case of the SNB, the link between the 
two appears to be loose. In particular, as mentioned above, the SNB cut interest rates aggres-
sively while sustaining a given policy course.
34 B (2006, p. 32) documents the following proportion of rate changes of 25 basis points or 
less: 79 percent for the Federal Reserve, 88 percent for the Bank of England, and 89 percent for 
the Riksbank. However, the comparison with the SNB is somehow blurred in that B’s 
sample does not include the current financial crisis. Still, until March 2006 (the end of B’s 
sample), the target range for the 3M-Libor was moved by 25 basis points in 47 percent of SNB 
changes. The same percentage of changes applies to a rate adjustment of 50 basis points.
the economy turned out to be much more favorable than expected, calling for 
a policy firming. By contrast, on 24 September 2001 the stance was loosened 
owing to an upward valuation of the Swiss franc in the wake of the uncertain-
ties linked to 9/11; this was to thwart the intention to relax the monetary condi-
tions decided the week before. Thus the more dramatic the impact of a shock, 
the higher the likelihood of an unscheduled decision.
Thirdly, the SNB showed total reversal aversion. In 47 monetary policy assess-
ments the target rate was changed 26 times (55 percent) but no policy reversal 
took place within three months. Avoiding reversals may prevent a loss in a cen-
tral bank’s credibility if a sequence of policy changes are (wrongly) interpreted 
as corrections of previous errors. Another reason for reversal reluctance may arise 
due to concerns about financial stability. A potential downside of reversal aver-
sion is that the central bank may end up falling behind the curve. In the case of 
the SNB, there is little evidence of this happening. The inflation rate remained 
within the price stability range in Switzerland, except for a spell in 2008 and 
2009 (cf. Section 8), and only in exceptional cases were interest rate hikes called 
for to meet the long-run objective. Probably the most compelling argument 
for reversal aversion at the SNB is its concern over a possible loss of credibility 
brought about by the markets’ flawed equating of a radical policy U-turn with 
the correction of previous errors.33
Fourthly, the proportion of 25-basis-point rate changes was 58 percent while 35 
percent of rate changes amounted to 50 basis points. This latter proportion stands 
out in an international context.34 Moreover, in the current financial crisis the 
SNB cut interest rates somewhat earlier than the Bank of Japan and the Swed-
ish, Norwegian and Danish central banks (the last three and the ECB even lifted 
rates for a while in 2008) but later than the Fed and the Bank of England, whose 
rate reductions had already started in September and December 2007. Note, 
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Figure 12: Official Interest Rates, G3 and CH
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35 As highlighted by B, H and J (2007) forsightedness is one 
of the guiding principles of the SNB.
36 Cf. J (2008a) for risk management in monetary policymaking.
37 As pointed out by M (2008), the by-now standard textbook theoretical linear-quad-
ratic framework in the conduct of monetary policy exemplified by W (2003) does 
not focus on risk management, which results in considerable policy inertia. Recent research 
shows that it is optimal for monetary policy to ease very aggressively in response to an adverse 
financial market shock (cf. D F and T, 2009). This finding contrasts sharply with 
the Taylor rule, which would prescribe only a mild response to financial meltdown.
however, that the SNB already cut its repo rate at the beginning of the financial 
crisis. From September 2007 to September 2008 the 1W-Repo rate was lowered 
by almost 50 basis points.
What is remarkable about the timing and size of the SNB’s rate adjustment 
is that GDP growth figures since 2007 had been clearly higher than in the US, 
the UK, the euro area, and Japan.
One way to interpret the SNB’s attitude in the critical stage of the financial 
crisis is that it is forward-looking35 or, alternatively, attaches great importance to 
the management of threats to the macro economy.36 Using monetary policy to 
take out insurance against tail risks leads to aggressive monetary policy responses 
when a large shock becomes evident. Its risk-management (pragmatic or flexible) 
approach may thus be a possible explanation for both its tendency to resort more 
often to relatively large rate adjustments and, as evidenced in the current crisis, 
its early shift to an aggressive policy in spite of good growth figures.37
Table 4: First Releases of GDP Growth Rates 2007–2009
US UK euro area J CH
Q1 2007 1.3 2.6 2.3 2.4 3.2
Q2 2007 3.4 3.3 1.3 0.5 3.9
Q3 2007 3.9 3.3 2.8 2.6 3.7
Q4 2007 0.6 2.5 1.7 3.7 4.2
Q1 2008 0.6 1.8 3.0 3.3 1.3
Q2 2008 1.9 0.7 −0.8 −2.4 1.5
Q3 2008 −0.3 −2.1 −0.8 −0.4 0.1
Q4 2008 −3.8 −5.9 −5.7 −12.7 −1.2
Q1 2009 −6.1 −7.4 −9.8 −15.2 −3.2
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38 This aspect of the SNB’s strategy is very similar to B’s (2004) OLIR (optimal long-
run inflation rate) proposition which he interprets as distinct from inflation targeting as com-
monly understood.
39 Taylor interest rates are regularly computed among other monetary policy rules. The rates 
shown in Figure 15 are computed with real-time data only from 2007 Q1 onwards. Note that 
the results are based on the original rule proposed by T (1993). This means, in particu-
lar, that the rule does not contain the exchange rate as a variable, based on the understand-
ing that any reaction of the interest rate to the exchange rate is indirect, through the effect of 
the exchange rate on inflation and the output gap. B (1999) and S (2000) have 
shown that a Taylor rule with the exchange rate included would hardly dominate the bench-
mark Taylor rule in small open economies.
Fifthly, elevated oil price volatility has posed a continuous challenge to Swiss 
monetary policy since 2004. The sharp rise in oil prices, in particular from 2007 
to mid-2008, increased inflationary pressure in the near term. As explained in 
Section 4 the implicit rule states that if inflation temporarily exceeds the 2 per-
cent ceiling in extraordinary circumstances, for example following a sudden 
massive rise in oil prices or strong exchange rate fluctuations, monetary policy 
does not necessarily need to be adjusted. This, however, does not mean that the 
SNB would react systematically to core inflation either, core inflation measures 
being just one of an array of indicators taken into account in shaping an over-
all picture of underlying inflationary pressure. The same applies to short-term 
deflationary pressures.38
Given that inflation expectations were well anchored, the SNB refrained from 
interest rate adjustments in response to firming oil prices for three reasons: i) the 
SNB believes that as long as the risk for second-round effects is small it would be 
wrong to try to stabilize oil-price-related fluctuations in the price level by rais-
ing interest rates. Experience has shown that a monetary policy which seeks – by 
way of interest rate increases – to prevent oil price rises from having an impact on 
the price level can significantly reinforce the adverse effect of such rises on the 
economy; ii) any attempt to compensate for an oil-price-related economic slow-
down by cutting interest rates merely increases the risk of a wage-price spiral. In 
particular, if a liquidity surplus already exists (as it did in 2004), the greater the 
likelihood of such second-round effects; and iii) the SNB’s assumption that the 
higher oil prices were short-lived suggested that any inflationary impact of these 
prices would gradually recede of its own accord.
Finally, as can be seen in Figure 15, actual short-term interest rates track those 
of a Taylor rule based on the CPI ex oil fairly well, at least until the aggrava-
tion of the financial crisis in 2008.39 A closer inspection of Figure 15 reveals, 
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Figure 14: Oil Price and Assumptions
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Note: Long-term assumptions refer to the oil price assumptions underlying the official inflation 
forecast in the long term. The ARIMA assumptions are the oil price assumptions underlying the 
inflation forecast of an ARIMA model in the short term.
Figure 15: Taylor Interest Rate and 3M-Libor
Taylor interest rate in real time
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however, that the 3M Libor was (still) systematically below the level proposed 
by the Taylor rule ex oil. From experience we can infer that a systematic under-
shooting of the Taylor rule (even ex oil) does not necessarily imply a policy mis-
take. On the contrary. In the Swiss case the time-varying difference between the 
Taylor rule and the actual 3M Libor is the result of the flexibility inherent in the 
monetary policy strategy or, equivalently, the leeway it offers for the use of judg-
ment by the Governing Board.
7. Crucial Decisions
Some monetary policy decisions of the SNB in the past decade had particu-
larly strong and lasting effects on financial markets in the intended direction. 
Most often they involved the exchange rate of the Swiss franc. The first of these 
decisions ensued from the scheduled assessment on March 23, 2000, when the 
target range for the 3M Libor was lifted by 75 basis points. The policy firming 
was aimed at counteracting the weak trend of the Swiss franc, which was lead-
ing to an undesirable relaxation of monetary conditions and posing a threat to 
price stability. By this move the SNB wanted to make it completely clear that it 
was pursuing an autonomous monetary policy geared to the domestic economy 
and not merely following in the wake of the ECB. As a result of this decision, 
the EUR/CHF exchange rate started to float again after a long period of almost 
unchanged rates.
Another policy decision which had a visible impact on the currency market 
was announced following from an unscheduled assessment on March 6, 2003. In 
the first quarter 2003 global economic and political uncertainties were adversely 
affecting the business climate in Switzerland and risked to delay the economic 
upturn that was expected to materialize that year. Therefore, a fortnight before 
the scheduled monetary policy assessment, the SNB slashed the target range for 
the reference rate by 50 basis points and announced a targeted level for the 3M 
Libor at around 0.25 percent. The move was intended to ward off a tightening 
of monetary conditions that would arise from a currency appreciation. The Swiss 
franc started to depreciate immediately after the cut. The impact was so strong 
that the SNB did not have to fall back on unconventional measures during this 
period.
The third decision worth mentioning was made public after the unscheduled 
assessment on November 20, 2008 which saw a one-percentage-point cut in the 
target range for the Libor to 0.5–1.5 percent. This time the SNB laid stress on 
reducing the risk premium in the money market and not on the foreign exchange 
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Figure 16: 3M-Libor CHF and CHF/EUR
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Figure 17: 3M-Libor CHF and CHF/EUR
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Figure 18: 3M-Libor CHF and Libor/TOIS Spread
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40 Cf. Section 9 and appendix II for an in-depth description of the measures put in place by the 
SNB in the financial crisis.
41 Inflation has been stationary with a mean of about 1 percent since 1993. This comes down to 
a successful anchoring of inflation expectations within the price stability definition, without 
resorting to a precise point target for inflation.
market. As can be seen in Figure 18, the firm lowering of the target range led to 
a significant decline in the risk premium, measured by the spread between the 
3M Libor and the corresponding TOIS rate.
The last decision to leave a strong mark upon market participants was made 
public at the scheduled assessment of March 12, 2009. Against the backdrop of a 
sharp deterioration in the economic situation and a looming risk of negative infla-
tion over a longer period of time, several monetary policy measures to prevent any 
further appreciation of the Swiss franc against the euro were announced.40
8. Impact on the Economy
In this section, we first analyze how the switch to the new strategy affected the 
Swiss economy and turn subsequently to a comparison over the last three dec-
ades. We find growing stability in the Swiss economy in terms of output growth 
and inflation (volatility) which goes hand in hand with the transition to the new 
monetary policy strategy. We also perceive a perpetuation of the trend to lower 
inflation rates which began in the mid-90s under monetary targeting.
8.1 The Last Ten Years
Legally the SNB is mandated to ensure price stability and in so doing take 
account of economic developments (cf. Section 3). During the period under con-
sideration the Swiss economy has been subject to several supply shocks. Arguably, 
by anchoring inflation expectations the economy becomes more stable, reducing 
the effect on overall inflation of adverse supply shocks. Have the strategy and its 
implied policy rule been successful? Figure 20 shows that the SNB reached its 
main objective of price stability in the last ten years, except for 2008–2009.41 A 
comparison reveals that the rise in the general price level has been lower than in 
the euro area, the US, the UK, and Canada.
Recently, the SNB ran the risk of allowing the inflation rate to persist above 
the price stability definition over a longer period. For the first time since the 
strategy was implemented in 2000 inflation exceeded the 2 percent ceiling and 
remained above this level during the first ten months of 2008. The trimmed-
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Figure 20: Consumer Price Index
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Figure 22: Core Inflation Measures SNB
% change from previous year CPI TM DFI
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Note: CPI is the consumer-price index, TM15 is the 15 percent trimmed mean, and DFI (Dynamic 
Factor Inflation) is a measure of core inflation which makes use of 450 nominal and real (daily 
and monthly) variables.
Figure 23: Consumer Price Index
% change from previous year CPI CPI excl. oil
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42 As can be seen from the set of figures in appendix I, each quarterly inflation forecast from 
December 2002 to December 2006 showed clearly that if the 3M-Libor had been left 
unchanged at the level valid at that time, the rate of inf lation would undoubtedly have 
exceeded the upper limit of 2 percent within a horizon shorter than three years.
mean core inflation measure gauged by the SNB (among other measures of core 
inflation) also temporarily surpassed the limit of 2 percent.
The bulk of the inflation pressure came from rising oil prices. However, as 
illustrated in Figure 23, even when corrected for the development in the oil price 
inflation rose from below 0.5 percent mid-2007 to 2 percent towards the end 
of 2008.
Without the dampening effect brought about by the financial crisis and the 
subsequent drop in oil and commodity prices the definition of price stability 
would probably have been violated over a more extended period of time. With 
hindsight we may conclude that monetary policy was kept too loose for too 
long during the third phase in light of the weak currency and the existing mon-
etary overhang and, as a result, a forecast medium-term inflationary pressure. 
As observed in Section 6, the monetary policy tightening in 2006 and 2007 was 
much more moderate than in 2000 in spite of an almost identical GDP growth 
outlook. The reason for the subdued policy reaction in 2006/07 was the uncer-
tainty about the strength of the economic activity and the fear of potential cur-
rency appreciation. With the wisdom of hindsight, the SNB arguably put too 
little weight on its prime objective of ensuring price stability, notwithstanding 
the correctness of the messages delivered by the inflation forecasts published at 
the time and confirmed by the money gap depicted in Figure 24.42 We conclude 
that if the SNB fell a little behind the curve, it was not because of a failure of its 
strategy but rather because of an arguably liberal interpretation of its mandate 
to take into account the economic situation. Note, however, that the strategy 
allows for short-term deviations from the range of price stability. They may be 
the result of shocks or of non-optimal policy decisions taken under uncertainty. 
The strategy requires corrections as soon as it becomes uncertain whether the 
deviation from price stability is only temporary or durable.
8.2 A Longer Perspective
In a longer perspective it is apparent that the falling trend in annual inflation rate 
which began in the 1990s continued after the turn of the century and pushed 
long-term average inflation (up to the past 15 years) within the price stability 
range for the first time since the 1970s. We may conclude that even if the new 
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43 Volatilities are calculated as the standard deviation of annual inflation and GDP from their 
period means.
44 Note that a low standard deviation for a particular year means that growth and inflation have 
been stable in the preceding ten years up to and including the year in question.
strategy did not improve the SNB’s performance on inflation, neither did it 
endanger the achievement of price stability.
A visual inspection of Figure 25 reveals that inflation this decade was lower 
and more stable than any decadal average in the post-1960 period. This pic-
ture is confirmed in Figure 26, which portrays the evolution of annual infla-
tion and its volatility since the adoption of an autonomous monetary policy by 
the SNB in 1973.43 As can be inferred from this Figure, the same conclusion 
holds for real GDP growth as well. A comparison of the average performance 
of the Swiss economy from the mid-1970s to the end of the 1990s with the last 
10 years yields two notable results. On the one hand, both growth and inflation 
were lower during the last decade. But on the other hand, the Swiss economy 
became more stable.44
Figure 24: Equilibrium Correction Model (ECM) for M3
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Note: The money gap is a measure of assessing potential inflationary or deflationary risks result-
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volume in the economy and the opportunity cost of holding money.
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Figure 25: Historical Inflation Rates for Switzerland for a Period of 50 Years  
Ending August 2009
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Figure 26: GDP Growth and Inflation
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It is also instructive to compare inflation volatility and output volatility on 
an ongoing basis, as in Figure 27. From this we can deduce a high volatility in 
inflation and real growth following the end of the Bretton Woods system of fixed 
exchange rates, which coincided with the early phase of monetary targeting. In 
the 1980s economic volatility decreased considerably. A further downward shift 
in volatility can be noted around the turn of the century. Inflation stabilized even 
more than output growth. Another observation is the substantial co-movement of 
these volatilities. The lack of a trade-off between growth and inflation suggests 
that the low and stable inflation rate pursued by the SNB helped reduce output 
volatility and supported economic activity. By the same token it furnished the 
SNB with leeway, enabling it to support the development of the economy.
The concurrence of an overall improvement in the performance of the Swiss 
economy with the transition to a new monetary policy strategy may be coinci-
dental or may match the worldwide improvements in growth and inflation (The 
Great Moderation). Indeed it is very likely that exogenous factors played a role. 
Strong international competition and higher productivity dampened inflationary 
pressure. It is very unlikely, however, that these exogenous factors tell us the whole 
story. After all, the past 10 years were not uneventful. A series of major changes 
and disruptions hit the Swiss economy, including the introduction of the euro, 
the Y2K problem, the burst of the dotcom bubble, 9/11, the 2001–03 recession, 
the implementation of the free movement of persons from EU countries as of 
Figure 27: GDP Growth and Inflation
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45 Unlike measures to access liquidity in Swiss francs, the provision of US dollar liquidity is inde-
pendent of the SNB’s monetary policy strategy and has no direct effects on the Swiss franc 
Libor. A detailed list of the new measures is included in appendix II.
June 1, 2007 (which gave rise to high immigration), shocks to the exchange rate, 
the oil price and, in particular, to the financial market; and, in the wake of the 
latter, a global recession that has posed unprecedented challenges to monetary 
policymaking. The SNB’s policy geared towards maintaining price stability has 
probably helped it reach its objectives more easily.
9. New Measures Taken to Steer the Money Market  
in the Financial Crisis
In this section we discuss in detail the measures the SNB adopted to achieve its 
goals in the financial turmoil of 2007 to 2009. Until 2007 money market stability 
played no decisive role in the SNB’s monetary policy decisions. This changed with 
the onset of the financial crisis in the summer 2007 and its escalation in terms of 
both depth and breadth. In its wake the stability of the interbank market became 
an essential element in the conduct of monetary policy, requiring a highly accom-
modative monetary policy reaction. Its mirror image were short-term nominal 
interest rates near zero and a major expansion of the SNB’s balance sheet. Faced 
with an impending recession, the SNB resorted to quantitative easing and credit 
easing to prevent an unwelcome appreciation of the Swiss franc and to lower the 
credit risk premia on Swiss franc corporate bonds. The measures were necessary 
because the scope for interest rate reductions had been exhausted.
9.1 Measures Supporting the Money Market
Since the onset of the financial crisis in August 2007, rising risk premia widened 
the gap between interest rates on unsecured and secured money market transac-
tions. This made steering the 3M Libor, which is based on unsecured transac-
tions, increasingly challenging. In addition to reducing the target range for the 
3M Libor and alongside ordinary Swiss franc open market operations, the SNB 
has taken a slew of other measures to counter the heightened pressure on money 
markets. They have been coordinated with other central banks and fall into two 
groups: measures to facilitate access to US dollar liquidity, and measures to facili-
tate access to Swiss franc liquidity.45
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46 Foreign-currency swaps have a long tradition in Swiss monetary policy. Under monetary tar-
geting USD swaps were the main instrument for controlling the monetary base.
47 In an American allocation system SNB Bills are allotted at the rate stated in the offer (dis-
criminatory auction). The other auction procedure based on a variable rate tender is the Dutch 
system, which would allot all SNB Bills at the lowest accepted rate (uniform price auction).
In the fourth quarter of 2008, the reduced supply of Swiss francs in the inter-
bank market exerted upward pressure on Swiss franc interest rates, rendering the 
management of the 3M Libor extremely challenging. In the previous few years, 
banks in Eastern Europe had granted Swiss-franc-denominated loans on a mas-
sive scale, partly refinancing themselves on the money markets. During the finan-
cial market turmoil in autumn 2008, many Swiss banks were no longer prepared 
to provide funds to refinance these loans to the same extent. When the Swiss 
franc money market dried up, the foreign banks found themselves in a delicate 
position since they had no access to SNB loans. The increased demand for Swiss 
francs led to considerable tension in the Swiss franc money market, pushing up 
the 3M Libor. The concomitant rise in Swiss interest rates was undesirable from 
a monetary policy perspective. To satisfy demand from banks domiciled abroad, 
the SNB has been providing Swiss franc funding to banks with no direct access 
to its operations. To this end it has been holding concerted auctions of EUR/
CHF swaps with the ECB and, as of mid-October 2008 and later on, also with 
the Polish and Hungarian central banks. These concerted EUR/CHF swap auc-
tions led to an unprecedented level of bank reserves and a significant easing of 
pressures in the money market rates.46
As of October 20, 2008, in a bid to absorb part of the reserves created by the 
EUR/CHF swaps, the SNB began issuing its own debt certificates (SNB Bills) 
in Swiss francs. These Bills are an ordinary monetary policy instrument which 
enables banks to place funds with the SNB in a form other than non-interest-
bearing sight deposits. SNB Bills allow the SNB to distribute large amounts of 
liquidity to banks and later to absorb liquidity again from the market, enhanc-
ing the SNB’s flexibility in liquidity management. In particular, the Bills allow 
greater use of cash-providing repo transactions with longer terms and of EUR/
CHF swaps. Moreover, SNB Bills are also accepted as collateral in repo transac-
tions, thus expanding the volume of collateral available. Unlike ordinary repo 
operations, which are auctioned in a fixed-rate tender, the auctions of SNB Bills 
take the form of a variable rate tender with allotment according to the Ameri-
can auction method.47
As a result of its extraordinary liquidity provision, claims from repo transac-
tions and the balances from swap transactions against Swiss francs rose sharply. 
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48 The average size of sight deposits from 2000 to 2006 was about CHF 4.3 bn.
The banks’ sight deposits at the SNB reached unprecedented levels.48 Between 
the onset of the financial turbulences and May 2009 the SNB’s balance sheet 
grew by more than CHF 100 bn. Since then it has receded somewhat.
9.2 Quantitative Easing and Credit Easing
Once nominal rates reach zero, conventional monetary policy no longer works. 
Although the monetary strategy offers flexibility to adopt conventional measures 
to lower the 3M Libor, the SNB was compelled to put in place unconventional 
measures – which, however, were fully compatible with its strategy. Unconven-
tional policy can be separated into measures of quantitative easing on the one 
hand and credit easing on the other. A quantitative easing measure endeavors to 
ease monetary conditions through the expansion of bank reserves without speci-
fying the corresponding asset to be purchased. Credit easing, by contrast, aims 
to influence specific market segments by means of interventions in the relevant 
Figure 28: The SNB’s Open Market Operations
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Figure 29: Claims from Repo Transactions
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asset. The SNB engaged in quantitative easing from December 2008 until March 
2009 and has complemented its policy measures by credit easing since then.
Coming under the heading of quantitative easing are foreign exchange inter-
ventions intended to meet the extra demand for Swiss francs generated by Swit-
zerland’s safe haven status. Over the past 15 years, verbal intervention was the 
SNB’s preferred strategy in times of stress for its currency. A 10 percent appre-
ciation of the Swiss franc against the euro between September 2008 and March 
2009 and the substantial risk of an even stronger appreciation thwarted the 
SNB’s intention to relax its monetary conditions in view of deflationary risks 
looming ahead and short-term interest rates essentially at zero. The real effective 
exchange rate had strengthened by 5.7 percent. Since the outbreak of the finan-
cial turmoil in August 2007 the Swiss franc appreciated in real effective terms 
by more than 9 percent. This, together with a shrinking interest rate differential 
to other currencies and the fact that other countries were resolutely pursuing a 
policy of quantitative easing, forced the SNB to take a more hands-on approach 
regarding the Swiss franc. In order to prevent any further appreciation of the 
Swiss franc against the euro and to corroborate its resolution to counter the for-
eign currency trend, the SNB announced at the monetary policy assessment of 
mid-March 2009 that it was making its first purchases of foreign currency in 15 
years. The foreign exchange interventions represented an unconventional policy 
measure because they increased the SNB’s risk exposure and because they were 
geared towards influencing a particular (relative) price. Moreover, as the pur-
chases of foreign currency were financed by base money creation, they lifted 
banks’ reserves above the level necessary for a zero-interest-rate policy, thus con-
tributing to quantitative easing.
At the same time the SNB also began an unprecedented credit easing policy 
aimed at soothing the tightening of financing conditions for companies on the 
capital market which further restrained aggregate demand and encumbered 
the transmission of monetary policy stimuli. With a view to lowering the term 
premium and the credit risk premium, the SNB started purchasing Swiss franc 
bonds issued by Swiss private sector borrowers but decided not to announce their 
size ex ante – unlike the Federal Reserve and the Bank of England. The decision 
on which class of bonds to be purchased was driven by the aim of facilitating 
Swiss firms’ access to the domestic capital market. The quantity was not fixed in 
advance but was determined gradually. The SNB also abstained from publishing 
a target quantity. Both a pre-fixed quantity and the announcement of a targeted 
quantity would have unnecessarily limited the SNB’s flexibility in achieving the 
intended market improvement. The third unconventional measure focused on 
the money market in the form of an extension of the maturity of repo operations 
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49 For the experience with the strategy before the outbreak of the subprime crisis in 2007, cf. 
J (2007b) and R (2006; 2007).
by up to one year. From December 2008 to April 2009, the SNB conducted 
repo operations with a maturity of 3, 6, 9 and 12 months which were fully allot-
ted against normal collateral. The objective was to diminish risk premia on the 
money market to prevent an unsuitable tightening of monetary conditions.
10. Has the Strategy Worked during the Financial Crisis?
A major goal of the SNB in the current financial crisis was to preserve the mon-
etary policy stance. To achieve this goal it had to ease tension in the money mar-
kets. Has the SNB accomplished it? It turns out that the SNB’s measures have 
been effective in stabilizing financial conditions in line with its intentions.49 The 
challenge was posed by the fluctuations in the 3M Libor. The key to its stabiliza-
tion at the intended level consisted in offsetting the sharp rise in the risk premia 
on the Libor – measured as the spread between the 3M Libor (an unsecured rate) 
and the 1W-Repo (a secured rate) – by subsequently setting the 1W-Repo rate 
lower (and injecting a sizeable amount of liquidity into the banking system if 
required). The risk premia rose from a few basis points before July 2007 to more 
than 175 basis points at the height of the financial turbulences. During 2009 the 
spread gradually declined but remained above its pre-crisis average (Figure 33). 
The volatile path of risk premia made steering the 3M Libor more difficult. 
After a first spike in the second half of 2007, risk premia for unsecured money 
market transactions fell again at the beginning of 2008, which led to an unde-
sired decrease in the 3M Libor. In order to keep the Libor in the middle of its 
target range, the rate for 1W-Repo transactions was gradually raised from 2.05 
percent to 2.40 percent until mid-February. Then, the increase in the risk premia 
in connection with the problems at Bear Sterns in March 2008 was counteracted 
by a reduction in the 1W-Repo rate to 1.90 percent. In turn, the 3M Libor could, 
again, be stabilized at the desired level.
In September, following the collapse of Lehman Brothers, risk premia rose 
even more sharply, pushing the 3M Libor up to 3.13 percent, i.e. about 40 basis 
points above the midpoint but still within the target range. The SNB responded 
by lowering the 1W-Repo rate to 1.60 percent. After the target range had been 
lowered to 2.00–3.00 percent on October 8, 2008, the 3M Libor briefly moved 
outside the range, prompting the SNB to further cut the 1W-Repo rate to 1.25 
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percent and offer repo transactions at terms of several months. The three subse-
quent reductions in the target range for the 3M Libor down to 0.00–1.00 percent 
were accompanied by corresponding cuts in the 1W-Repo down to 0.05 percent. 
The rate for 1W-Repo transactions has remained at this level since December 11, 
2008. It is the lowest SNB rate since the introduction of (electronic) repo trans-
actions in April 1999. As a result, the risk premia were brought down faster than 
in other currencies. The flexibility incorporated in the SNB strategy may also 
have contributed to this outcome.
A related feature of its operational approach, which also proved to be par-
ticularly advantageous during the current crisis, is that the SNB can change its 
repo rates without much fanfare and at short notice while central banks that are 
geared to a very short-term (repo) rate must announce a change in the key inter-
est rate every single time.
Due to the risk premium, it took a while for the 3M Libor for Swiss francs 
to approach the aimed-for mid-point of the (asymmetric) target range agreed in 
March 2009. Since very short-term repo rates are practically at the zero lower 
bound, does this mean the end of the SNB’s monetary policy strategy? We believe 
not. The EUR/CHF swaps, together with the three unconventional measures 
taken since March 2009, led to a marked increase in liquidity. The forex inter-
ventions, geared primarily towards forestalling deflation, proved successful; and 
the appreciation trend of the Swiss franc was broken, as intended. Central to the 
Figure 33: Spread between 1W-Repo Rate and 3M-Libor
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Figure 34: Nominal Exchange Rate CHF/EUR
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liquidity injections into the capital market was a reduction in the risk premia; this 
was since observable and has made borrowing cheaper. The long-term repo trans-
actions further enhanced liquidity in the banking system. Given their effective-
ness, the three unconventional measures were confirmed at the monetary policy 
assessment of mid-June 2009. At the mid-September assessment, the SNB reit-
erated its intention to provide the economy with a generous supply of liquidity 
and to continue to act decisively to prevent any appreciation of the Swiss franc 
against the euro. It was announced that the purchases of Swiss franc bonds would 
be maintained if necessary.
The monetary policy strategy proved successful in coming to grips with unprec-
edented events during the financial crisis. Consequently, neither the public nor 
the media called it into question.
11. Crucial Questions
In this section we address some critical questions linked to the SNB’s strategy. 
The first is whether the definition of price stability is appropriate. The second 
relates to the appropriateness of the 3M Libor as the operational target. We then 
ask about the set of information underlying monetary policy decisions. The 
fourth question revolves round the type of inflation forecast to be published. The 
next question relates to the degree of transparency, and the final one pertains to 
the flexibility of the strategy.
11.1 Is the Definition of Price Stability Appropriate?
The monetary policy success notwithstanding, the question arises whether the 
attained level of inflation, while commensurate to the SNB’s mandate, has not 
been too low. There is a broad awareness that below a certain inflation rate, 
the benefits of reduced microeconomic distortions gained from price stability 
are outweighed by the costs of short-term nominal interest rates too frequently 
approaching the zero lower bound and of nominal wage rigidity. This argument 
underlies the view that a central bank should try to preserve a buffer zone for the 
inflation rate in normal times. With an inflation rate that is too low, short-term 
interest rates are likely to be close to zero, raising the probability of deflation 
and a binding zero bound on the nominal interest rate – which poses a threat 
to output stability. In such a situation a central bank may want to make short-
term real rates negative, but this is impossible if the inflation rate is zero or even 
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50 Cf. B (2005, p. 23).
negative. If inflation is expected to fall below zero, the real rate will rise, result-
ing in an effective tightening of monetary conditions. As a result, the economy 
may be less stable when inflation is kept too low on average. Twice this decade, 
Swiss short-term interest rates have almost reached the zero lower bound, and 
the probability of possible deflation rose significantly.
Does this buffer argument suggest that any positive rate of inflation of less 
than two percent is too ambitious and that – also contrary to SNB practice – it 
is of material importance whether this rate is closer to two percent or less than 
one percent over the long term? How does the SNB compare with other central 
banks in this respect? According to a survey of practices at 20 IT central banks, 
the eight rich countries in the sample use either 2 percent or 2.5 percent as the 
midpoint of their target range.50
From this comparison we deduce that the SNB’s thinking about what rep-
resents price stability is in line with a handful of comparable central banks in 
industrialized countries. However, its quantitative definition – annual inflation 
below 2 percent – is somewhat more ambitious than in the latter. Thus, the fact 
that Switzerland flirted twice with the zero lower bound over the past 10 years 
Figure 36: 1W-Repo Rate, 3M-Libor and CPI
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while other industrialized countries (apart from Japan) did so only in the course 
of the current financial crisis suggests that the reason may indeed be a lack of a 
buffer due to the country’s traditionally lower realized inflation rate and, hence, 
lower interest rates than abroad.
Could a more moderate interest rate policy have prevented the 1W-Repo rate 
from essentially hitting the zero lower bound in two instances, from April 2003 
to mid-June 2004 (when it was fixed at 0.11 percent) and since mid-December 
2008, with a rate set at 0.05 percent. As first argued by G (1991) the 
likelihood of hitting the zero lower bound depends on how much a monetary 
authority has to move short-term interest rates to affect longer-maturity rates 
and thus aggregate demand. The longer an interest rate reduction is expected to 
persist into the future, the greater the impact it will have on long-term interest 
rates and aggregate demand and inflation. The more gradually the central bank 
changed interest rates in response to most shocks in times when a zero-bound 
episode is not threatening, the smaller the size of interest rate moves needed to 
counter a fall in demand and the lower the likelihood that the central bank will 
have to bring its rates down to zero. In order to make it more probable that the 
conventional interest rate policy will still be feasible upon the emergence of large 
demand shocks, such an approach entails moving rates by less in response to most 
shocks. However, the downside to these tactics would be increased variability of 
inflation and output.
Should a relaxation in the definition of what constitutes price stability, say in 
line with the ECB, be considered? Following a comprehensive review of its strat-
egy in 2003, the ECB Governing Council confirmed the explicit quantitative 
definition announced in 1998 but explained that it aimed to maintain infla-
tion rates “below, but close to, 2 percent” over the medium term. The clarifica-
tion emphasized the need for a safety margin against the risk of deflation which 
was also sufficient to cover the potential presence of a measurement bias in the 
price index as well as the consequences of inflation differentials within the cur-
rency union.51 Unlike the euro area Switzerland does not face significant per-
sistent inflation differentials among its regions that would necessitate changing 
the quantitative definition of price stability. And given the variability of Swiss 
inflation resulting from the openness of its economy, fine-tuning the inflation 
rate is doomed to failure. Widening the value for annual inflation in the defini-
tion of price stability, for instance to two percent, would not seem to be benefi-
cial for the Swiss economy either. First of all, two percent inflation per annum 
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52 At an annual inf lation rate of one percent it takes 70 years for the price level to double, 
whereas it takes only 35 years for the price level to double if the annual rate of inflation is two 
percent.
53 While wage flexibility is relatively high, the country faces higher price stickiness than the US 
or the euro area (cf. K, 2009), which explains the comparably extensive lag between 
monetary policy impulses and the response of the economy outlined in Section 4.
54 Cf. R and R (2010).
cannot be equated with price stability.52 It would in all likelihood also raise infla-
tion (expectations) and nominal interest rates permanently – leading to indexa-
tion mechanisms in the economy which would perpetuate inflation – and yet 
have only very uncertain effects in terms of escaping the zero lower bound trap. 
In this connection it is worth bearing in mind that the zero lower bound is less 
of a problem for the conduct of monetary policy because there is arguably little 
downward wage rigidity in Switzerland owing to the SNB’s credibility in terms 
of maintaining a low-inflation regime.53 Moreover, as explained in Section 9, 
once the zero lower bound trap snaps shut, the SNB can have successful recourse 
to unconventional policy tools. We thus conclude that a value for annual infla-
tion between zero and two percent represents an optimal level of inflation for 
the Swiss economy.
11.2 Is the 3M Libor an appropriate operational target?
Two questions arise in this context. The first is about the ability to control an 
interest rate with a three-month term. The second relates to the economic rel-
evance and accuracy of the Libor.
A fundamental critique that may be leveled against the strategy of the SNB 
is that the reference interest rate is not under its direct control. Central banks, 
some observers maintain, can only control the overnight rate, but not longer-term 
rates exhibiting risk premia. The SNB’s operational approach proved the contrary 
even under severely stressed market conditions. It is true that the SNB cannot 
control the 3M Libor perfectly because it is driven by expectations about future 
overnight rates and is subject to a liquidity, credit and term risk premium which 
can vary widely. Owing to these properties of its reference rate, the SNB has to 
communicate its monetary policy intentions openly and clearly, and act accord-
ingly. If the 3M Libor moves ahead of the next monetary policy assessment in 
accordance with the SNB’s aim, it stands on the sidelines. Otherwise the SNB 
adopts measures to keep the reference rate at the announced level. These measures 
mainly comprise verbal interventions by the Governing Board and also changes 
in the repo rate or the liquidity provision.54 Over the years, the SNB has acquired 
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the necessary skills to steer the 3M Libor. Although it cannot be controlled pre-
cisely, the SNB has learned how to keep it sufficiently close to its policy target. 
The high (positive) correlation between the 1W-Repo rate and the 3M Libor rate 
observable during most of the past decade bears witness to the SNB’s ability to 
keep the reference interest rate under tight control.
In the financial crisis market participants became increasingly aware that the 
Libor incorporates a risk premium. For years the risk premium was small. During 
the crisis, trading in 3M Swiss franc interbank loans diminished due to an abrupt 
loss of confidence on the interbank market. In turbulent times, a three-month 
maturity is very long. Accordingly, the risk premium increased substantially and 
became volatile. At the same time some observers argued that the Libor does not 
accurately reflect the borrowing costs in the unsecured interbank market. The 
ensuing discussion among market specialists could not uncover any systematic 
mispricing in the Libor (cf., for example, S, 2009). A survey conducted 
by the SNB came to the conclusion that the Libor remains by far the most impor-
tant benchmark rate for credit and derivative pricing in the Swiss franc business. 
Importantly, the diminished trading activity on money markets did not reduce 
the credit supply in the Swiss economy. Unlike other countries, credit activity in 
Switzerland was not interrupted in the wake of the financial crisis.
By steering an interest rate that directly influences private-sector credit costs 
and thus final domestic demand, the SNB succeeded in maintaining a monetary 
policy stance which at least partly shielded the domestic economy from the surge 
in the level and volatility of money market risk premia. Thanks to this opera-
tional approach, the SNB arguably achieved a better stabilization of a key inter-
est rate than other central banks that target the overnight rate. For instance, as is 
shown in Figure 37, from September 2007 to June 2008 both the ECB and the 
SNB pursued an “unchanged monetary policy stance”. An identical policy objec-
tive brought forth striking differences in its effects on the money market. While 
the SNB’s policy intention was reflected in slight fluctuations of the Swiss franc 
3M Libor around the aimed-for level, the 3M euro Libor exhibited a significantly 
higher deviation from the ECB’s policy rate. The stabilization of the 3M Swiss 
franc Libor was the result of the “automatic monetary stabilizers” in the form of 
fluctuations in the repo rate.55 By contrast, the ECB kept its minimum bid rate 
fixed, which enhanced the volatility in the Euribor. We can conclude that the 3M 
Libor operational target served the SNB well before and during the crisis.
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11.3 Do Policy Decisions Take into Account all the Relevant Information 
Available?
The use of narrow inflation targets with one- to two-year horizons has been pun-
ished by a failure to manage the credit boom and bust of the last few years. As 
consumer prices were depressed over the past decade by rapid globalization and 
technological leaps, central banks, many observers maintain, persisted in setting 
interest rates with reference to CPI targets and largely ignored huge parallel bub-
bles in credit and housing markets. As a result, central banks were eventually 
forced into unprecedented monetary policy remedies to cope with the fallout, 
discarding explicit or implicit inflation targets in the process.
Did the information set on which the SNB has based its decisions miss deci-
sive elements for the conduct of a successful monetary policy? We believe not. 
For one thing, its main indicator for future policy decisions, an inflation forecast 
looking three years ahead, takes into account all relevant information such as the 
predictions of money models, among other models, with their (albeit imperfect) 
focus on financial behavior in the transmission mechanism. In addition, a con-
tinued emphasis on the role of money and credit in evaluating inflation perspec-
tives has been a distinguishing mark of its inflation forecast-based strategy from 
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56 Contrary to the ECB, the monetary analysis is not a separate pillar of its strategy. Nor did the 
SNB define a reference value for the growth rate of a monetary aggregate.
the beginning.56 For this reason the SNB regularly analyzed and presented the 
change in the monetary conditions in its press releases, comprising the growth 
rate of money and credit aggregates as well as the situation on the domestic real 
estate market. And in contrast to other industrialized countries, Switzerland was 
not hit by any credit or real estate bubble in the past decade. Note also that the 
strategy allows for reactions to the build-up of unbalances even if they have no 
immediate impact on inflation.
11.4 What Type of Inflation Forecast Should We Publish?
In recent years an intensive debate arose about the type of inflation forecast a 
central bank should publish. A central bank may or may not announce the policy 
rate underlying projections of inflation (and other target variables). If it opts for 
an announcement, the question is about the interest rate assumption to be pub-
lished. Three options are in principle available. The monetary policymaker can 
either assume an interest rate path given by market expectations of future rates, 
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57 The forecasting quality of the SNB’s conditional inflation forecasts is documented in S 
and G (2010). For more on the SNB’s attitude to alternative ways to condition infla-
tion forecasts cf. J (2008b), and J and R (2009).
58 Cf. R (2002) and J (2007a).
an explicit rate path that can be interpreted as an optimal interest rate plan, or 
a constant interest rate.
A major drawback of conditioning inflation forecasts on market expectations 
is the limited ability to predict future monetary policy actions over a longer 
period. Inflation forecasts based on policymakers’ planned interest path appear 
to be superior to market expectations because the central bank may have more 
information pertinent to the future course of monetary policy than the market. 
Market expectations may adjust quickly to a central bank’s communication about 
how it perceives the economic outlook, rendering the transmission of monetary 
policy impulses to the economy more efficient. As explained in Section 2, the 
SNB publishes its inflation forecasts predicated on keeping the 3M Libor decided 
at the last policy assessment constant over the entire forecast horizon. The con-
ditional inflation forecasts published by the SNB convey similar information 
to an interest rate forecast but without the disadvantages, such as careful and 
costly explanations in case of forecast errors, reduction in monetary policy flex-
ibility (implicit commitment of the Governing Board), and the risk of divert-
ing public attention from the central bank’s main objective.57 Inflation forecasts 
based on constant interest rates over a long horizon are likely to be unrealistic 
and prone to other shortcomings. However, in the end, they may prove less seri-
ous than those arising from forecasts resting on market expectations or on poli-
cymakers’ optimal interest rate paths. The SNB circumvents the inadequacies 
of its approach by giving the market a clear guidance on how to interpret the 
forecasts. So far there has not been any convincing reason why the SNB should 
abandon this practice.
11.5 Is the SNB Transparent?
The SNB commits itself to regular and open communication of its strategy, its 
interpretation of incoming macroeconomic data, the decision-making process, the 
economic outlook and the view for future policy moves to align market expec-
tations with its own intentions.58 Figure 39 compares the path of the 3M Libor 
with market expectations and indicates the extent to which market participants 
anticipated central bank actions. The heavier line represents the 3M Libor while 
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59 Note that this observation is not unique to Switzerland but holds for other countries as well, as 
documented by M (2007). Mackie’s sample does not include the current financial crisis. 
However, M reports that from 2004–2006, the last three years in his sample, the fore-
cast errors in the Swiss market were the second smallest out of 10 currency areas, including the 
US, the euro area, Japan, Britain, Sweden, Norway, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand.
the thinner lines portray forward rate yield curves. Forecast errors occur when 
the lighter lines are above the heavier line (overestimation of the 3M Libor) or 
below it (underestimation of the 3M Libor).
The chart reveals some interesting facts, in particular some persistency in fore-
cast errors. The 3M Libor was underpredicted during the first monetary policy 
phase (upward shift in the reference rate). By contrast, in the second phase (ref-
erence rate cuts) the size of the 3M Libor was overpredicted.59 In the third phase 
(rate normalization) interest rate decisions corresponded with market expecta-
tions, except for at the beginning when markets expected more aggressive policy 
Figure 39: Money Market Rate Expectations
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60 Cf. R and R (2010).
moves. In the fourth phase interest rate decisions again proved difficult to antic-
ipate, which is less of a surprise given the heavy market turbulences that charac-
terized this policy phase. Interestingly, predictions were no longer systematically 
wrong in the same direction.
In view of the difficulties of market participants to foresee monetary policy 
decisions, the question arises whether the SNB made good its promise on trans-
parency and predictability or whether it only paid lip service to it. In order to 
answer the question it is important to distinguish between uncertainty about 
the shape of the SNB’s reaction function, which causes systematic errors in pre-
dicting monetary policy moves, and the arrival of unanticipated shocks wrong-
footing the SNB itself. Expectation errors may be due either to inadequate or 
insufficient communication, a radical change in the macroeconomic landscape 
compelling the monetary authority to abruptly change its policy course, or con-
scious attempts to surprise market participants.
As the evidence suggests, the SNB kept the markets and the public regularly 
informed through different communication channels.60 Notwithstanding its reg-
ular efforts to keep the public abreast of its thinking and intentions, the arrival 
of shocks demands swift changes to previous plans. This occurred on several 
occasions, as shown in chart 40, which compares quarterly GDP forecasts made 
public by the SNB with the latest GDP figures released by the Swiss Federal Sta-
tistical Office. A “+” means a seasonally adjusted annualized rate (saar) GDP 
forecast in even years while a “♦” points to a forecast in odd years. The lines link 
forecasts belonging to the same year. Hence, the first GDP forecast for 2000, 
announced in 1999 Q4, amounted to 1.8 percent. It was continuously revised 
up to 3.3 percent. Forecasts for 2001, beginning with around 2 percent issued in 
Q3 2000, were subsequently revised downward to 1.5 percent in Q4 2001. Fore-
casts for 2002 were revised downwards even more, from in the order of 1 percent 
in Q4 2001 to zero growth at the end of 2002. The expected growth dynamics 
pertaining to 2003 fell even more markedly, from an estimate of just over 1 per-
cent released in Q4 2002 to roughly −0.5 percent in the second half of 2003. 
The economic outlook for 2004 brightened appreciably, which was reflected in a 
growth forecast between 1.5 and 2 percent for the year. For 2005 the first growth 
forecast was 1.5–2.0 percent and the last value announced in the last quarter was 
just over 1.5. By contrast the growth outlook for 2006 was marked up from just 
over 2 percent to close to 3 percent. A similar GDP performance was expected 
for 2007. As for the expectations of 2008, they were set at about 2 percent in Q4 
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61 In general the Figure points to a disturbing systematic underestimation of both cyclical down-
turns and upturns. Forecasting GDP growth is quite a complex process. R and S 
(2002) found on the basis of 766 observations by 14 different institutes, including the SNB, 
that the forecasts of Swiss GDP made during the year for the current year or in the autumn 
for the following year are both informative and clearly better than naive forecasting methods. 
However, even the forecasts made at year-end for the current year still had an average forecast 
error of about 0.5 percentage points. Moreover, C-C, H and Z (2008) 
found that Swiss GDP revisions are large. Via its effect on output gaps, the inaccuracy of GDP 
estimates risks inducing a procyclical bias in monetary policy.
2007 and then in a range of 1.5 and 2 percent. The outlook for 2009 darkened 
considerably from the first estimate of −0.5 to −1 percent communicated at the 
end of 2008 down to −2.5 to −3.0 percent announced in Q2 2009, followed by 
a marked upward revision in Q3 of −1.5 to −2 percent.61
As can be inferred from the chart, the massive interest rate cuts from 2001 
to 2003 and again in 2008 were the response to the arrival of new informa-
tion which suggested severe shifts in the macro landscape and required a policy 
adjustment. While the difference between the first and the final growth predic-
tion was still contained in 2001, it widened to −1 percentage point in 2002 and 
−1.5 percentage points in 2003. The largest adjustment came about in 2009 with 
a growth revision of −2 percentage points. The SNB could not help slashing 
Chart 40: SNB GDP Forecasts and SFSO GDP Releases
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62 The variability in the growth forecasts explain to a certain extent the q-o-q changes in the 
final forecast value for inflation deployed in Table 1.
63 As we argued in Section 8.1, this reticence in tightening was probably inappropriate.
64 Cf. J (2007a).
interest rates out of consideration for inflation and growth.62 However, while an 
upward growth revision for 2000 of +1.5 percentage points gave rise to a tight-
ening in the 3M Libor of 150 basis points, an improvement in the growth pros-
pects for 2006 and 2007 of +1 and +1.1 percentage points, respectively, resulted 
in a rate increase of only 100 basis points per year.63
Overall, these observations suggest that when the macroeconomic situation 
shifts abruptly, participants in the financial markets will find it more difficult 
to predict monetary policy actions, even in the next few months and even with 
good communication by the central bank. As suggested in Section 7 transparency 
is not a goal in itself. From time to time unanticipated policy moves may prove 
necessary to align market expectations when they are out of kilter with those of 
the central bank.64 This is particularly true in times of major financial market 
uncertainty. J, R and S (2009) show that the reaction 
of the 3M Libor to repo rate changes and changes to the target range depends 
on the market environment. In normal times repo operations are instrumental 
in smoothing the 3M Libor and thus the monetary policy stance. During tur-
bulent phases, by contrast, unexpected changes in the target range (together with 
a larger liquidity provision through repo operations) have the strongest impact 
on the level of the 3M Libor.
11.6 How Flexible is the SNB’s Strategy?
J, R and S (2009) argue that the most noticeable charac-
teristic of the SNB’s strategy is a balance between the long-term objective of price 
stability and a pragmatic short-term flexibility in the implementation of the mon-
etary policy. Indeed, the strategy turned out to be very flexible along different 
dimensions. It not only offered ample scope for adding new forecast models and 
indicators while retracting outdated ones, but it also ensured the autonomy nec-
essary to conduct a policy of stability. The fact that the inflation forecast is only 
the main indicator and not a target to be met also allowed the Governing Board 
to take decisions that were not necessarily closely linked to the inflation forecasts 
but the result of judgment, a broadening of the horizon for the conduct of policy, 
and a careful risk assessment. As the financial crisis unfolded, the functioning 
and stability of the money market received more emphasis and, as the turmoil in 
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financial markets deepened, new policy instruments and actions fully consistent 
with its strategy could be taken at short notice. J, R and S-
 (2009) show empirically that the short-term flexibility in the SNB’s imple-
mentation process allowed for a regular provision of liquidity in normal times 
and a swift response to exogenous financial market shocks one the one hand and 
the achievement of the intended policy stance in distressed periods on the other. 
The Swiss franc funding facility introduced to accommodate a high demand for 
Swiss francs coming from foreign banks in the euro area with no direct access to 
SNB operations had the planned effect of reducing the 3M Libor.
The SNB’s operating framework is characterised by a high degree of flexibil-
ity along several dimensions, ranging from repo rate settings to the allotment 
of liquidity at repo auctions and their frequency. Flexibility has to be dealt with 
carefully, however. Excessive flexibility can impair transparency and risk a loss 
in the credibility it has built up with regard to its ability to preserve price stabil-
ity. In order to avoid potentially detrimental effects to its credibility, the SNB 
is committed to clear and timely communication of its decisions and to imple-
menting them as announced. This way, the central bank increases its effective-
ness and, in turn, contributes to its credibility with regard to its ability to pre-
serve price stability in the medium term.
12. Conclusions
At the end of the 1990s the SNB put in place a new framework for the conduct 
of its monetary policy. This was aimed at guaranteeing a certain continuity for 
Swiss monetary policy in order to maintain the good reputation for committing 
to price stability that it had built up in the past. The strategy proved remarkably 
successful. It helped the SNB to rapidly re-establish the credibility of its policy 
procedure, which had been gradually undermined under monetary targeting in 
the second half of the 1990s, and contributed to an impressive performance in 
spite of an economic climate characterized by dramatic international turbulence 
and major monetary policy challenges.
Thanks to the width of the target range and the choice of a reference interest 
rate for three-month loans, the SNB has had the necessary flexibility to respond 
rapidly to distortions in the financial markets, yet without casting doubt on 
its underlying policy direction. The announcement of an explicit definition 
of what constitutes price stability has not constrained short-run policy. The 
SNB acknowledges that there will be periods when the two percent level will 
be breached but refrains from setting out a contingent strategy in the event of 
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specific shocks or a precise time horizon to bring inflation back on target. Given 
that the monetary authorities of small, open economies can only affect the price 
level with long and uncertain lags, they cannot be overambitious and try to steer 
price developments in the short run. Accordingly, the SNB refrains from fine-
tuning inflation. Nor would it resist a temporary deviation from the price sta-
bility zone if circumstances so demand. Consistent rule-based behavior is suffi-
cient for the public and market participants to understand the way in which the 
SNB takes policy actions. Judgmental decisions by the Governing Board which 
need not be based entirely on an inflation forecast are fully consistent with the 
monetary policy strategy and its implied rule-like approach.
The monetary policy strategy embarked on ten years ago has been beneficial 
for the variables of ultimate interest. Inflation was kept within the price stabil-
ity range. In addition, both inflation and GDP growth stabilized with respect 
to the past. The target range allowed the SNB to absorb the effects of market 
expectations about the future course of short-term rates on the 3M Libor. The 
strategy has been particularly successful during the current financial crisis thanks 
to its built-in “automatic monetary stabilizers”. By varying the repo rates the 
SNB kept its reference rate, to which mortgage, prime lending, and other retail 
interest rates are linked, at the intended level. This policy shielded the domestic 
economy to a very considerable extent from the surge in the size and volatility 
of the risk premia inherent in the 3M Libor during the financial turmoil. Suc-
cessful monetary policy in the past 10 years has contributed to strengthening 
the SNB’s credibility which, in turn, has increased flexibility in the implemen-
tation of its strategy.
Reducing the target range for the 3M Libor has not been sufficient to coun-
ter the effects of an escalating financial crisis. Policy measures adopted by other 
central banks made it necessary to introduce unconventional measures in Swit-
zerland as well. With a series of unprecedented operations the SNB revived the 
interbank money market. Both the conventional policy tools and the unconven-
tional policy actions adopted were perfectly commensurate with the goal and 
operational framework set out by the monetary policy strategy. In many respects, 
the actions have been extensions of the traditional methods of operation to estab-
lish monetary conditions suggested by the inflation forecasts and the Governing 
Board’s general assessment of the inflation and economic activity outlook. Some 
measures have taken the central bank into new territory but were consistent with 
its monetary policy strategy.
Further challenges still lie ahead. The SNB’s suite-of-model approach is not 
riskless in the current market environment, for standard macroeconomic models 
are constructed to replicate normal conditions and regularities in the economy 
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and may fail to capture and incorporate historically exceptional events. A particu-
lar case in point is when large shocks or special circumstances arise, such as asset 
price bubbles or financial instability. The fact that the current financial problems 
may not be smoothly squared with inflation forecasts derived from models in 
which financial assets do not or only incompletely play an active role means that 
the importance of model-based policy-making must be re-weighted in favor of 
decisions driven more by simple indicators and good judgment.
Another challenge is the need to absorb the large amount of liquidity created 
in the last two years to tackle the financial crisis. At some point, when the econ-
omy recovers from recession, the SNB is going to have to drain the huge amount 
of liquidity in the economy and raise interest rates, which will reduce the SNB’s 
balance sheet to a level consistent with price stability in the longer term. An exit 
strategy to unwind the extra monetary stimulus when market conditions improve 
raises two questions. The first is related to the tools to be used to withdraw this 
money, and the second is the question of when is the right time to do so. Tech-
nically, reversing the money flow poses no problems as the liquidity provided to 
the banking system comes largely in the form of short-term repos and currency 
swaps. When these operations expire without being rolled over, the additional 
monetary stimulus will be discontinued and the banks’ reserves at the SNB drop 
automatically. In addition, the SNB can issue its Bills when it thinks fit in order 
to mop up excess liquidity and cease intervening on the foreign exchange mar-
kets. Private-sector bonds can be sold and interest rates in that market pushed 
up, thus helping the SNB to temper growth if the economy begins to overheat. 
Any (possible) delayed exit from the capital market will have to be compensated 
by other instruments.
Finding the right time to turn around the current policy course is a more 
intricate challenge. This will be decisive in order to ensure a non-inflationary 
recovery. In principle, the exit strategy for the SNB is endogenous to its mon-
etary strategy. The trigger will be a fundamental change in its inflation forecast 
based on a coherent picture painted by a suite of different models and indica-
tors. However, structural econometric models and indicators do not fully cover 
all the unconventional measures. Time-series models and indicators as well as 
judgment, taking into account an array of further information, will be required. 
The generally positive experience with the exit strategy enacted in 2004 gives us 
cause for optimism but also warns us against attaching too much importance 
to uncertainties about GDP growth and expected reactions of the foreign cur-
rency market.
A challenging question directly related to the SNB’s strategy is whether asset 
prices should be considered in setting monetary policy. In the last 10 years the 
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SNB has taken asset prices into consideration in its inflation forecasts. Whether 
asset price developments should be countered by ‘leaning against the wind’ before 
finding expression in the inflation forecast remains an open issue.
All in all, based on the knowledge accumulated from 10 years of experience 
with the monetary policy strategy we conclude that the SNB was right to aban-
don monetary targeting without tying its hands with an inflation-targeting strat-
egy excessively tailored to the vision of the functioning of a modern economy 
represented by the New Keynesian paradigm. Modern monetary theory now 
demonstrates that almost any additional friction – which, after all, brings the 
theoretical model closer to economic reality – implies that inflation targeting 
may not be optimal when interpreted relatively strictly. Although sharing many 
of the characteristics of the inflation targeting framework (same set of informa-
tion, same tools for decision-making, and identical means of communication), 
the strategy did not force the SNB to attain a precise inflation target in a pre-
scribed period. This allowed the Governing Board to use its judgment in taking 
monetary policy decisions, which is particularly important in turbulent times. 
At the same time, it succeeded in anchoring inflation expectations in accord-
ance with the mandate conferred upon the SNB. The financial markets and 
the public seem to agree with the SNB’s actions. At no time have they seriously 
questioned their validity.
Appendix
Table 1: Final Value of the Inflation Forecasts  
and Underlying Interest Rate Assumptions
Inflation forecast as of Final forecast value Quarterly change in 
forecast in bp
Interest rate 
assumption
Q4 1999 1.9% 1.75%
Q2 2000 1.6% −30 3.50%
Q4 2000 1.5% −10 3.50%
Q2 2001 1.2% −30 3.25%
Q4 2001 1.75% +55 1.50%
Q2 2002 1.9% +15 1.25%
Q4 2002 2.0% +10 0.75%
Q1 2003 2.5% +50 0.25%
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Inflation forecast as of Final forecast value Quarterly change in 
forecast in bp
Interest rate 
assumption
Q2 2003 2.5%  = 0.25%
Q3 2003 2.8% +30 0.25%
Q3 2003 3.0% +20 0.25%
Q1 2004 3.0%  = 0.25%
Q2 2004 3.2% +20 0.50%
Q3 2004 2.9% −30 0.75%
Q4 2004 2.6% −30 0.75%
Q1 2005 2.6%  = 0.75%
Q2 2005 2.4% −20 0.75%
Q3 2005 2.6% +20 0.75%
Q4 2005 2.7% +10 1.00%
Q1 2006 2.4% −30 1.25%
Q2 2006 2.7% +30 1.50%
Q3 2006 2.3% −40 1.75%
Q4 2006 1.9% −40 2.00%
Q1 2007 1.8% −10 2.25%
Q2 2007 1.9% +10 2.50%
Q3 2007 2.0% +10 2.75%
Q4 2007 1.5% −50 2.75%
Q1 2008 1.5%  = 2.75%
Q2 2008 1.3% −20 2.75%
Q3 2008 1.3%  = 2.75%
Q4 2008 0.6% −70 0.50%
Q1 2009 0.3% −30 0.25%
Q2 2009 0.7% +40 0.25%
Q3 2009 2.3% +160 0.25%
Note: The endpoint forecasts amounting to or exceeding 2 percent are shown in bold. Until the 
end of 2002 changes were semiannual.
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2 . 0
1 . 5
1 . 0
0 . 5
0 . 0
1 9 9 9 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 2 0 0 2 2 0 0 3 2 0 0 4 2 0 0 5
F o r e c a s t  J u n e  2 0 0 2  ( 1 . 2 5 % ) I n fl a t i o n F o r e c a s t  J u n e  2 0 0 2  ( 1 . 2 5 % ) F o r e c a s t  D e c e m b e r  2 0 0 2  ( 0 . 7 5 % )
2 0 0 1
P e r c e n t a g e  c h a n g e  i n  n a t i o n a l  c o n s u m e r  p r i c e  i n d e x  f r o m  p r e v i o u s  y e a r
I n fl a t i o n F o r e c a s t  D e c e m b e r  2 0 0 0  ( 3 . 5 0 % )
I n fl a t i o n  F o r e c a s t  D e c e m b e r  2 0 0 0  ( L i b o r  =  3 . 5 0 % )  a n d  J u n e  2 0 0 1  ( L i b o r  =  3 . 2 5 % )
2 . 5
2 . 0
1 . 5
1 . 0
0 . 5
0 . 0
1 9 9 8 1 9 9 9 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 2 0 0 2 2 0 0 3 2 0 0 4
P e r c e n t a g e  c h a n g e  i n  n a t i o n a l  c o n s u m e r  p r i c e  i n d e x  f r o m  p r e v i o u s  y e a r
I n fl a t i o n  F o r e c a s t  J u n e  2 0 0 1  ( L i b o r  =  3 . 2 5 % )  a n d  D e c e m b e r  2 0 0 1  ( L i b o r  =  1 . 7 5 % )
1 . 7 5
1 . 5 0
1 . 2 5
1 . 0 0
0 . 7 5
0 . 5 0
0 . 2 5
0 . 0 0
1 9 9 8 1 9 9 9 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 2 0 0 2 2 0 0 3 2 0 0 4
F o r e c a s t  J u n e  2 0 0 1  ( 3 . 2 5 % ) I n fl a t i o n F o r e c a s t  J u n e  2 0 0 1  ( 3 . 2 5 % ) F o r e c a s t  D e c e m b e r  2 0 0 1  ( 1 . 7 5 % )

 
J


 / P

 / R


P e r c e n t a g e  c h a n g e  i n  n a t i o n a l  c o n s u m e r  p r i c e  i n d e x  f r o m  p r e v i o u s  y e a r
I n fl a t i o n F o r e c a s t  J u n e  2 0 0 3
I n fl a t i o n  F o r e c a s t  J u n e  2 0 0 3  ( L i b o r  =  0 . 2 5 % )  a n d  S e p t e m b e r  2 0 0 3  ( L i b o r  =  0 . 2 5 % )
3 . 0
2 . 5
2 . 0
1 . 5
1 . 0
0 . 5
0 . 0
P e r c e n t a g e  c h a n g e  i n  n a t i o n a l  c o n s u m e r  p r i c e  i n d e x  f r o m  p r e v i o u s  y e a r
I n fl a t i o n  F o r e c a s t  S e p t e m b e r  2 0 0 3  ( L i b o r  =  0 . 2 5 % )  a n d  D e c e m b e r  2 0 0 3  ( L i b o r  =  0 . 2 5 % )
3 . 0
2 . 5
2 . 0
1 . 5
1 . 0
0 . 5
0 . 0
F o r e c a s t  S e p t e m b e r  2 0 0 3 I n fl a t i o n F o r e c a s t  S e p t e m b e r  2 0 0 3 F o r e c a s t  D e c e m b e r  2 0 0 3
2 0 0 3
P e r c e n t a g e  c h a n g e  i n  n a t i o n a l  c o n s u m e r  p r i c e  i n d e x  f r o m  p r e v i o u s  y e a r
I n fl a t i o n F o r e c a s t  D e c e m b e r  2 0 0 2
I n fl a t i o n  F o r e c a s t  D e c e m b e r  2 0 0 2  ( L i b o r  =  0 . 7 5 % )  a n d  M a r c h  2 0 0 3  ( L i b o r  =  0 . 2 5 % )
2 . 5
2 . 0
1 . 5
1 . 0
0 . 5
P e r c e n t a g e  c h a n g e  i n  n a t i o n a l  c o n s u m e r  p r i c e  i n d e x  f r o m  p r e v i o u s  y e a r
I n fl a t i o n  F o r e c a s t  M a r c h  2 0 0 3  ( L i b o r  =  0 . 2 5 % )  a n d  J u n e  2 0 0 3  ( L i b o r  =  0 . 2 5 % )
2 . 5
2 . 0
1 . 5
1 . 0
0 . 5
F o r e c a s t  M a r c h  2 0 0 3 I n fl a t i o n F o r e c a s t  M a r c h  2 0 0 3 F o r e c a s t  J u n e  2 0 0 3
 2 0 0 0  2 0 0 1  2 0 0 2  2 0 0 3  2 0 0 4  2 0 0 5  2 0 0 6
 1 9 9 9  2 0 0 0  2 0 0 1  2 0 0 2  2 0 0 3  2 0 0 4  2 0 0 5  2 0 0 0  2 0 0 1  2 0 0 2  2 0 0 3  2 0 0 4  2 0 0 5  2 0 0 6
 2 0 0 0  2 0 0 1  2 0 0 2  2 0 0 3  2 0 0 4  2 0 0 5  2 0 0 6
T
en Years’ E
xperience w
ith the Sw
iss N
ational B
an
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
P e r c e n t a g e  c h a n g e  i n  n a t i o n a l  c o n s u m e r  p r i c e  i n d e x  f r o m  p r e v i o u s  y e a r
I n fl a t i o n F o r e c a s t  J u n e  2 0 0 4
I n fl a t i o n  F o r e c a s t  J u n e  2 0 0 4  ( L i b o r  =  0 . 5 0 % )  a n d  S e p t e m b e r  2 0 0 4  ( L i b o r  =  0 . 7 5 % )
3 . 5
3 . 0
2 . 5
2 . 0
1 . 5
1 . 0
0 . 5
P e r c e n t a g e  c h a n g e  i n  n a t i o n a l  c o n s u m e r  p r i c e  i n d e x  f r o m  p r e v i o u s  y e a r
I n fl a t i o n  F o r e c a s t  S e p t e m b e r  2 0 0 4  ( L i b o r  =  0 . 7 5 % )  a n d  D e c e m b e r  2 0 0 4  ( L i b o r  =  0 . 7 5 % )
3 . 0
2 . 5
2 . 0
1 . 5
1 . 0
0 . 5
F o r e c a s t  S e p t e m b e r  2 0 0 4 I n fl a t i o n F o r e c a s t  S e p t e m b e r  2 0 0 4 F o r e c a s t  D e c e m b e r  2 0 0 4
2 0 0 4
P e r c e n t a g e  c h a n g e  i n  n a t i o n a l  c o n s u m e r  p r i c e  i n d e x  f r o m  p r e v i o u s  y e a r
I n fl a t i o n F o r e c a s t  D e c e m b e r  2 0 0 3
I n fl a t i o n  F o r e c a s t  D e c e m b e r  2 0 0 3  ( L i b o r  =  0 . 2 5 % )  a n d  M a r c h  2 0 0 4  ( L i b o r  =  0 . 2 5 % )
3 . 0
2 . 5
2 . 0
1 . 5
1 . 0
0 . 5
P e r c e n t a g e  c h a n g e  i n  n a t i o n a l  c o n s u m e r  p r i c e  i n d e x  f r o m  p r e v i o u s  y e a r
I n fl a t i o n  F o r e c a s t  M a r c h  2 0 0 4  ( L i b o r  =  0 . 2 5 % )  a n d  J u n e  2 0 0 4  ( L i b o r  =  0 . 5 0 % )
3 . 5
3 . 0
2 . 5
2 . 0
1 . 5
1 . 0
0 . 5
F o r e c a s t  M a r c h  2 0 0 4 I n fl a t i o n F o r e c a s t  M a r c h  2 0 0 4 F o r e c a s t  J u n e  2 0 0 4
 2 0 0 1  2 0 0 2  2 0 0 3  2 0 0 4  2 0 0 5  2 0 0 6  2 0 0 7
 2 0 0 0  2 0 0 1  2 0 0 2  2 0 0 3  2 0 0 4  2 0 0 5  2 0 0 6  2 0 0 1  2 0 0 2  2 0 0 3  2 0 0 4  2 0 0 5  2 0 0 6  2 0 0 7
 2 0 0 1  2 0 0 2  2 0 0 3  2 0 0 4  2 0 0 5  2 0 0 6  2 0 0 7
 
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
P e r c e n t a g e  c h a n g e  i n  n a t i o n a l  c o n s u m e r  p r i c e  i n d e x  f r o m  p r e v i o u s  y e a r
I n fl a t i o n F o r e c a s t  J u n e  2 0 0 5
I n fl a t i o n  F o r e c a s t  J u n e  2 0 0 5  ( L i b o r  =  0 . 7 5 % )  a n d  S e p t e m b e r  2 0 0 5  ( L i b o r  =  0 . 7 5 % )
3 . 0
2 . 5
2 . 0
1 . 5
1 . 0
0 . 5
P e r c e n t a g e  c h a n g e  i n  n a t i o n a l  c o n s u m e r  p r i c e  i n d e x  f r o m  p r e v i o u s  y e a r
I n fl a t i o n  F o r e c a s t  S e p t e m b e r  2 0 0 5  ( L i b o r  =  0 . 7 5 % )  a n d  D e c e m b e r  2 0 0 5  ( L i b o r  =  1 . 0 0 % )
3 . 0
2 . 5
2 . 0
1 . 5
1 . 0
0 . 5
F o r e c a s t  S e p t e m b e r  2 0 0 5 I n fl a t i o n F o r e c a s t  S e p t e m b e r  2 0 0 5 F o r e c a s t  D e c e m b e r  2 0 0 5
2 0 0 5
P e r c e n t a g e  c h a n g e  i n  n a t i o n a l  c o n s u m e r  p r i c e  i n d e x  f r o m  p r e v i o u s  y e a r
I n fl a t i o n F o r e c a s t  D e c e m b e r  2 0 0 4
I n fl a t i o n  F o r e c a s t  D e c e m b e r  2 0 0 4  ( L i b o r  =  0 . 7 5 % )  a n d  M a r c h  2 0 0 5  ( L i b o r  =  0 . 7 5 % )
3 . 0
2 . 5
2 . 0
1 . 5
1 . 0
0 . 5
P e r c e n t a g e  c h a n g e  i n  n a t i o n a l  c o n s u m e r  p r i c e  i n d e x  f r o m  p r e v i o u s  y e a r
I n fl a t i o n  F o r e c a s t  M a r c h  2 0 0 5  ( L i b o r  =  0 . 7 5 % )  a n d  J u n e  2 0 0 5  ( L i b o r  =  0 . 7 5 % )
3 . 0
2 . 5
2 . 0
1 . 5
1 . 0
0 . 5
F o r e c a s t  M a r c h  2 0 0 5 I n fl a t i o n F o r e c a s t  M a r c h  2 0 0 5 F o r e c a s t  J u n e  2 0 0 5
 2 0 0 2  2 0 0 3  2 0 0 4  2 0 0 5  2 0 0 6  2 0 0 7  2 0 0 8
 2 0 0 1  2 0 0 2  2 0 0 3  2 0 0 4  2 0 0 5  2 0 0 6  2 0 0 7  2 0 0 2  2 0 0 3  2 0 0 4  2 0 0 5  2 0 0 6  2 0 0 7  2 0 0 8
 2 0 0 2  2 0 0 3  2 0 0 4  2 0 0 5  2 0 0 6  2 0 0 7  2 0 0 8
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
P e r c e n t a g e  c h a n g e  i n  n a t i o n a l  c o n s u m e r  p r i c e  i n d e x  f r o m  p r e v i o u s  y e a r
I n fl a t i o n F o r e c a s t  J u n e  2 0 0 6
I n fl a t i o n  F o r e c a s t  J u n e  2 0 0 6  ( L i b o r  =  1 . 5 0 % )  a n d  S e p t e m b e r  2 0 0 6  ( L i b o r  =  1 . 7 5 % )
P e r c e n t a g e  c h a n g e  i n  n a t i o n a l  c o n s u m e r  p r i c e  i n d e x  f r o m  p r e v i o u s  y e a r
I n fl a t i o n  F o r e c a s t  S e p t e m b e r  2 0 0 6  ( L i b o r  =  1 . 7 5 % )  a n d  D e c e m b e r  2 0 0 6  ( L i b o r  =  2 . 0 0 % )
F o r e c a s t  S e p t e m b e r  2 0 0 6 I n fl a t i o n F o r e c a s t  S e p t e m b e r  2 0 0 6 F o r e c a s t  D e c e m b e r  2 0 0 6
2 0 0 6
P e r c e n t a g e  c h a n g e  i n  n a t i o n a l  c o n s u m e r  p r i c e  i n d e x  f r o m  p r e v i o u s  y e a r
I n fl a t i o n F o r e c a s t  D e c e m b e r  2 0 0 5
I n fl a t i o n  F o r e c a s t  D e c e m b e r  2 0 0 5  ( L i b o r  =  1 . 0 0 % )  a n d  M a r c h  2 0 0 6  ( L i b o r  =  1 . 2 5 % )
P e r c e n t a g e  c h a n g e  i n  n a t i o n a l  c o n s u m e r  p r i c e  i n d e x  f r o m  p r e v i o u s  y e a r
I n fl a t i o n  F o r e c a s t  M a r c h  2 0 0 6  ( L i b o r  =  1 . 2 5 % )  a n d  J u n e  2 0 0 6  ( L i b o r  =  1 . 5 0 % )
F o r e c a s t  M a r c h  2 0 0 6 I n fl a t i o n F o r e c a s t  M a r c h  2 0 0 6 F o r e c a s t  J u n e  2 0 0 6
 2 0 0 3  2 0 0 4  2 0 0 5  2 0 0 6  2 0 0 7  2 0 0 8  2 0 0 9
 2 0 0 2  2 0 0 3  2 0 0 4  2 0 0 5  2 0 0 6  2 0 0 7  2 0 0 8  2 0 0 3  2 0 0 4  2 0 0 5  2 0 0 6  2 0 0 7  2 0 0 8  2 0 0 9
 2 0 0 3  2 0 0 4  2 0 0 5  2 0 0 6  2 0 0 7  2 0 0 8  2 0 0 9
3 . 0
2 . 5
2 . 0
1 . 5
1 . 0
0 . 5
2 . 5
2 . 0
1 . 5
1 . 0
0 . 5
3 . 0
2 . 5
2 . 0
1 . 5
1 . 0
0 . 5
3 . 0
2 . 5
2 . 0
1 . 5
1 . 0
0 . 5

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

P e r c e n t a g e  c h a n g e  i n  n a t i o n a l  c o n s u m e r  p r i c e  i n d e x  f r o m  p r e v i o u s  y e a r
I n fl a t i o n F o r e c a s t  J u n e  2 0 0 7
I n fl a t i o n  F o r e c a s t  J u n e  2 0 0 7  ( L i b o r  =  2 . 5 0 % )  a n d  S e p t e m b e r  2 0 0 7  ( L i b o r  =  2 . 7 5 % )
P e r c e n t a g e  c h a n g e  i n  n a t i o n a l  c o n s u m e r  p r i c e  i n d e x  f r o m  p r e v i o u s  y e a r
I n fl a t i o n  F o r e c a s t  S e p t e m b e r  2 0 0 7  ( L i b o r  =  2 . 7 5 % )  a n d  D e c e m b e r  2 0 0 7  ( L i b o r  =  2 . 7 5 % )
F o r e c a s t  S e p t e m b e r  2 0 0 7 I n fl a t i o n F o r e c a s t  S e p t e m b e r  2 0 0 7 F o r e c a s t  D e c e m b e r  2 0 0 7
2 0 0 7
P e r c e n t a g e  c h a n g e  i n  n a t i o n a l  c o n s u m e r  p r i c e  i n d e x  f r o m  p r e v i o u s  y e a r
I n fl a t i o n F o r e c a s t  D e c e m b e r  2 0 0 6
I n fl a t i o n  F o r e c a s t  D e c e m b e r  2 0 0 6  ( L i b o r  =  2 . 0 0 % )  a n d  M a r c h  2 0 0 7  ( L i b o r  =  2 . 2 5 % )
P e r c e n t a g e  c h a n g e  i n  n a t i o n a l  c o n s u m e r  p r i c e  i n d e x  f r o m  p r e v i o u s  y e a r
I n fl a t i o n  F o r e c a s t  M a r c h  2 0 0 7  ( L i b o r  =  2 . 2 5 % )  a n d  J u n e  2 0 0 7  ( L i b o r  =  2 . 5 0 % )
F o r e c a s t  M a r c h  2 0 0 7 I n fl a t i o n F o r e c a s t  M a r c h  2 0 0 7 F o r e c a s t  J u n e  2 0 0 7
 2 0 0 4  2 0 0 5  2 0 0 6  2 0 0 7  2 0 0 8  2 0 0 9  2 0 1 0
 2 0 0 3  2 0 0 4  2 0 0 5  2 0 0 6  2 0 0 7  2 0 0 8  2 0 0 9  2 0 0 4  2 0 0 5  2 0 0 6  2 0 0 7  2 0 0 8  2 0 0 9  2 0 1 0
 2 0 0 4  2 0 0 5  2 0 0 6  2 0 0 7  2 0 0 8  2 0 0 9  2 0 1 0
2 . 2 5
2 . 0 0
1 . 7 5
1 . 5 0
1 . 2 5
1 . 0 0
0 . 7 5
0 . 5 0
0 . 2 5
2 . 5
2 . 0
1 . 5
1 . 0
0 . 5
2 . 0 0
1 . 7 5
1 . 5 0
1 . 2 5
1 . 0 0
0 . 7 5
0 . 5 0
0 . 2 5
2 . 0 0
1 . 7 5
1 . 5 0
1 . 2 5
1 . 0 0
0 . 7 5
0 . 5 0
0 . 2 5
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
P e r c e n t a g e  c h a n g e  i n  n a t i o n a l  c o n s u m e r  p r i c e  i n d e x  f r o m  p r e v i o u s  y e a r
I n fl a t i o n F o r e c a s t  J u n e  2 0 0 8
I n fl a t i o n  F o r e c a s t  J u n e  2 0 0 8  ( L i b o r  =  2 . 7 5 % )  a n d  S e p t e m b e r  2 0 0 8  ( L i b o r  =  2 . 7 5 % )
P e r c e n t a g e  c h a n g e  i n  n a t i o n a l  c o n s u m e r  p r i c e  i n d e x  f r o m  p r e v i o u s  y e a r
I n fl a t i o n  F o r e c a s t  S e p t e m b e r  2 0 0 8  ( L i b o r  =  2 . 7 5 % )  a n d  D e c e m b e r  2 0 0 8  ( L i b o r  =  0 . 5 0 % )
F o r e c a s t  S e p t e m b e r  2 0 0 8 I n fl a t i o n F o r e c a s t  S e p t e m b e r  2 0 0 8 F o r e c a s t  D e c e m b e r  2 0 0 8
2 0 0 8
P e r c e n t a g e  c h a n g e  i n  n a t i o n a l  c o n s u m e r  p r i c e  i n d e x  f r o m  p r e v i o u s  y e a r
I n fl a t i o n F o r e c a s t  D e c e m b e r  2 0 0 7
I n fl a t i o n  F o r e c a s t  D e c e m b e r  2 0 0 7  ( L i b o r  =  2 . 7 5 % )  a n d  M a r c h  2 0 0 8  ( L i b o r  =  2 . 7 5 % )
P e r c e n t a g e  c h a n g e  i n  n a t i o n a l  c o n s u m e r  p r i c e  i n d e x  f r o m  p r e v i o u s  y e a r
I n fl a t i o n  F o r e c a s t  M a r c h  2 0 0 8  ( L i b o r  =  2 . 7 5 % )  a n d  J u n e  2 0 0 8  ( L i b o r  =  2 . 7 5 % )
F o r e c a s t  M a r c h  2 0 0 8 I n fl a t i o n F o r e c a s t  M a r c h  2 0 0 8 F o r e c a s t  J u n e  2 0 0 8
 2 0 0 5  2 0 0 6  2 0 0 7  2 0 0 8  2 0 0 9  2 0 1 0  2 0 1 1
 2 0 0 4  2 0 0 5  2 0 0 6  2 0 0 7  2 0 0 8  2 0 0 9  2 0 1 0  2 0 0 5  2 0 0 6  2 0 0 7  2 0 0 8  2 0 0 9  2 0 1 0  2 0 1 1
 2 0 0 5  2 0 0 6  2 0 0 7  2 0 0 8  2 0 0 9  2 0 1 0  2 0 1 1
3 . 0
2 . 5
2 . 0
1 . 5
1 . 0
0 . 5
3 . 0
2 . 5
2 . 0
1 . 5
1 . 0
0 . 5
2 . 5
2 . 0
1 . 5
1 . 0
0 . 5
3 . 0
2 . 5
2 . 0
1 . 5
1 . 0
0 . 5
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

P e r c e n t a g e  c h a n g e  i n  n a t i o n a l  c o n s u m e r  p r i c e  i n d e x  f r o m  p r e v i o u s  y e a r
I n fl a t i o n F o r e c a s t  J u n e  2 0 0 9
I n fl a t i o n  F o r e c a s t  J u n e  2 0 0 9  ( L i b o r  =  0 . 2 5 % )  a n d  S e p t e m b e r  2 0 0 9  ( L i b o r  =  0 . 2 5 % )
F o r e c a s t  S e p t e m b e r  2 0 0 9
2 0 0 9
P e r c e n t a g e  c h a n g e  i n  n a t i o n a l  c o n s u m e r  p r i c e  i n d e x  f r o m  p r e v i o u s  y e a r
I n fl a t i o n F o r e c a s t  D e c e m b e r  2 0 0 8
I n fl a t i o n  F o r e c a s t  D e c e m b e r  2 0 0 8  ( L i b o r  =  0 . 5 0 % )  a n d  M a r c h  2 0 0 9  ( L i b o r  =  0 . 2 5 % )
P e r c e n t a g e  c h a n g e  i n  n a t i o n a l  c o n s u m e r  p r i c e  i n d e x  f r o m  p r e v i o u s  y e a r
I n fl a t i o n  F o r e c a s t  M a r c h  2 0 0 9  ( L i b o r  =  0 . 2 5 % )  a n d  J u n e  2 0 0 9  ( L i b o r  =  0 . 2 5 % )
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II. New Measures Taken by the SNB to Steer the Money Market  
during the Financial Crisis
a) Measures to facilitate access to US dollar liquidity
On December 12, 2007, the SNB announced coordinated action with the Bank 
of Canada, Bank of England, the ECB and the Federal Reserve to facilitate 
banks’ access to US dollar liquidity. It was also announced that the Fed would 
make US dollar liquidity available to the SNB in a reciprocal swap agreement. 
On December 17, 2007 and January 14, 2008, it thus offered 28-day US dollar 
repo transactions in return for SNB-eligible collateral for up to USD 4 bil-
lion on each occasion.
On 11 March 11, 2008, following a break, the SNB announced that it had 
decided, in consultation with the Fed, to resume its US dollar repo auctions. 
On March 25 and April 22, it therefore offered 28-day repo transactions for 
a maximum of USD 6 billion on each date.
On May 2, 2008, the SNB announced that, in consultation with the Fed, it 
would be stepping up US dollar repo auctions. It was decided that auctions 
would be held fortnightly. Since the term (28 days) and maximum amount of 
liquidity per auction (USD 6 billion) were left unchanged, the total liquid-
ity made available therefore doubled from a maximum of USD 6 billion to a 
maximum of USD 12 billion. The SNB held auctions on the following dates: 
May 6 and 20, June 3 and 17, and July 1, 15 and 29.
On July 30, 2008, the SNB decided, in consultation with the Fed, to also make 
longer-term USD liquidity available. From August 12, it therefore offered 
84-day liquidity. The 28-day repo auctions were retained. The maximum out-
standing total amount remained unchanged at USD 12 billion.
On September 19, 2008, the SNB decided, in consultation with the Fed, to 
conduct daily US dollar repo auctions for up to USD 10 billion of overnight 
liquidity. In addition, the amount made available in 28-day auctions was 
increased from USD 6 billion to USD 8 billion while the liquidity offered at 
84-day auctions was raised from USD 6 billion to USD 9 billion. The maxi-
mum outstanding amount for all terms therefore increased from USD 12 bil-
lion to USD 27 billion.
On September 26, 2008, the SNB held a US dollar repo auction with a term of 
7 days for up to USD 9 billion in order to make available to its counterparties 
additional US dollar liquidity extending beyond the end of the quarter. At the 
same time, it temporarily reduced the maximum volume of the daily overnight 
US dollar repo auctions from USD 10 billion to USD 7 billion.
 J / P / R
On September 29, 2008, the SNB decided – in consultation with the Fed – to 
raise the limit on its swap line with the Fed from USD 30 billion to USD 60 
billion. Concurrently, the term of the swap arrangement was extended until 
the end of 2009.
On October 13, 2008, the SNB announced jointly with the Bank of England, 
the ECB, the Fed and the Bank of Japan that it would in future be conducting 
auctions for US dollar liquidity with 7-day, 28-day and 84-day terms at fixed 
interest rates for full allocation. Since this meant that counterparties could 
borrow any amount in return for the appropriate collateral, the maximum 
amount of the swap arrangement with the Fed was unspecified. The SNB 
also announced that it would continue holding overnight US dollar auctions 
where necessary to accommodate market demand. The overnight auctions for 
US dollar liquidity that had been held every working day since September 18 
were discontinued on November 5 due to the decline in demand.
On December 19, 2008, the SNB, in agreement with other central banks includ-
ing the Federal Reserve, will continue conducting US dollar liquidity-provid-
ing operations at terms of 7, 28 and 84 days as long as needed. The operations 
will be carried out as fixed rate tenders with full allotment.
On February 2, 2009, the SNB announced that it will issue its own debt cer-
tificates in US dollars (SNB USD Bills) with terms of less than one year as of 
mid-February 2009. The new monetary policy instrument will be used until 
further notice to finance the SNB’s loan to the SNB StabFund. The auction 
will take the form of a variable rate tender with allotment according to the 
Dutch auction method. The denomination is USD 0.5 million and the SNB 
USD Bills are offered with terms of 28, 84 and 168 days.
On February 3, 2009, the SNB announced that it had extended the temporary 
reciprocal currency arrangements (swap lines) with the Federal Reserve to 
October 30, 2009 in order to address continued pressures in global US dollar 
funding markets. The SNB reiterated that it will continue conducting US 
dollar operations at terms of 7, 28 and 84 days as long as needed.
On June 25, 2009, the SNB, in accordance with the ECB and the Bank of Eng-
land, announced to continue conducting US dollar liquidity-providing repo 
operations at terms of 7 and 84 days during the third quarter of 2009.
On September 24, 2009, the SNB, in accordance with the ECB and the Bank of 
England, announced that it will continue to offer US dollar liquidity opera-
tions at a term of 7 days through January 2010. Given the improved conditions 
in funding markets, the SNB will discontinue the 84-day US dollar liquidity 
operations as of October 6, 2009.
Ten Years’ Experience with the Swiss National Bank’s Monetary Policy Strategy 
b) Measures to Facilitate Access to Swiss Franc Liquidity
On October 15, 2008, the SNB and the ECB decided on joint measures to pro-
vide Swiss franc funding to banks that do not have direct access to the SNB’s 
market operations. The SNB announced that every Monday, starting on Octo-
ber 20, it would conduct fixed-price currency swaps with a term of 7 days in 
collaboration with the Eurosystem. The SNB concluded a temporary swap 
arrangement with the ECB in order to offer the ECB access to Swiss franc 
liquidity for allocation to banks in its jurisdiction.
Also on October 15, the SNB announced that it was planning to issue its own 
bills (SNB Bills) on a regular basis in the future. Through this liquidity-absorb-
ing instrument, the SNB gains greater flexibility in ordinary liquidity-creation 
operations. In particular, it means that greater use can be made of repo trans-
actions with longer terms.
On October 29, 2008, the SNB offered banks currency swaps with a three-month 
term for the first time. In line with the measures announced on October 15, 
it provided Swiss francs in return for euros.
On November 7, 2008, the SNB concluded an EUR/CHF swap arrangement 
with the Polish central bank in order to offer it access to Swiss franc liquidity 
for allocation to the banks in its jurisdiction. On November 17, for the first 
time, the Polish central bank took part in the weekly currency swap operation 
of the SNB and the Eurosystem.
On December 19, 2008, the SNB announced that it had acquired a first tranche 
of illiquid and other assets from UBS on December 16, 2008. The purchase 
price of USD 16.4 billion reflects the value of the assets as of September 30, 
2008.
On January 16, 2009, the SNB, the ECB and the NBP jointly announced that 
they will continue the one-week foreign exchange swap operations at least until 
the end of April 2009 to support further improvements in the short-term Swiss 
franc money markets.
On January 28, 2009, the SNB and the Magyar Nemzeti Bank (MNB) 
announced the establishment of a temporary EUR/CHF swap arrangement 
which allows the MNB to provide Swiss franc funding to banks in its juris-
diction in the form of foreign exchange swaps. Starting on February 2, 2009, 
the MNB will join the weekly EUR/CHF foreign exchange swap operations 
conducted under the umbrella of the SNB. The EUR/CHF swap operations 
will be conducted with a term of 7 days at a fixed price. This measure will be 
in place at least until the end of April 2009.
 J / P / R
On February 10, 2009, the SNB announced that it had agreed with UBS to 
acquire assets for a lower maximum amount than originally planned. The 
maximum volume of assets to be transferred decreased from its original level 
of approximately USD 60 billion to USD 38.7 billion. The categories of assets 
not to be transferred comprised securities backed by student loans and assets 
that have been wrapped by monoline insurers.
On April 6, 2009, the SNB announced that it agreed to enter into a new tem-
porary currency swap arrangement with the Federal Reserve. The swap line 
enables the Federal Reserve to draw Swiss franc liquidity of up to CHF 40 bil-
lion against U.S. dollars when needed to provide Swiss franc liquidity to US 
financial institutions. The new swap line mirrors the existing arrangement that 
enables the SNB to draw US dollars against Swiss francs. Both swap arrange-
ments are authorized through 30 October 2009.
On September 24, 2009, the SNB, the ECB, the Narodowy Bank Polski and the 
Magyar Nemzeti Bank jointly announced that they will continue to conduct 
the EUR/CHF foreign exchange swaps providing Swiss francs against euros 
with a term of 7 days through January 2010.
References
B, L (1999), “Policy Rules for Open Economies”, in John B. Taylor 
(ed.), Monetary Policy Rules, University of Chicago Press.
B, E, P M. H and T J. J 
(2007), “The Swiss National Bank’s Monetary Policy Concept – an Exam-
ple of a ‘Principles Based’ Policy Framework”, Swiss National Bank Economic 
Study No.3 2007.
B, E, A M. F and T J. J (2007), 
“Strong Goal Independence and Inflation Targets”, European Journal of Politi-
cal Economy, 23, pp. 88–105.
B, C (2005), “Experience of Inflation-Targeting in 20 countries”, Eco-
nomic Review, 1, pp. 20–47.
B, B S. (2004), “Inflation Targeting”, Federal Reserve Bank of St. 
Louis Review, 86 (4), pp. 165–168.
B, O and J G (2006), “Real Wage Rigidities and the 
New Keynesian Model”, prepared for the FRB/JMCB conference Quantita-
tive Evidence on Price Determination, Washington, D.C., September 29–30, 
2005.
Ten Years’ Experience with the Swiss National Bank’s Monetary Policy Strategy 
B, O and J G (2008), “Labor Markets and Monetary 
Policy: A New-Keynesian Model with Unemployment”, Mimeo, March 6.
B, A S. (2006), “Monetary Policy Today: Sixteen Questions and about 
Twelve Answers”, paper prepared for the Banco de España Conference Cen-
tral Banks in the 21st Century, Madrid, June 8–9, April 2006.
C, A and M R. S (2006), “Inflation Targeting Regimes”, 
European Economic Review, 50, pp. 1297–1315.
C-C, N, P H and A Z (2008), “Swiss 
GDP Revisions: A Monetary Policy Perspective”, Journal of Business Cycle 
Measurement and Analysis, 4 (2), pp. 183–213.
C, L, R M, M R (2007), “Two 
Reasons Why Money and Credit May be Useful in Monetary Policy”, NBER 
Working Paper 13502.
C, L, C I, R M, and M R-
 (2007), “Monetary Policy and Stock Market Boom-Bust Cycles”, 
Mimeo, March 6.
D F, F and O T (2009), “Optimal Monetary Policy 
in a Model of the Credit Channel”, Mimeo, www.frbsf.org/economics/con-
ferences/0903/defiore_tristani.pdf.
F, E (2009), “Ramsey Monetary Policy with Labor Market Frictions”, 
Journal of Monetary Economics, 56, pp. 570–581.
F, J and D W. H (2004), “Is Inflation Targeting Best-
Practice Monetary Policy?”, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review, 86 
(4), pp. 117–144.
G, M (1991), “Interest Rates and the Conduct of Monetary 
Policy”, Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy 34, pp. 7–30.
H, P M. (2004), „Vom Monetarismus zur Inflationsprognose: 
Dreissig Jahre Schweizerische Geldpolitik“, Öffentliche Vorlesung, Univer-
sität Bern, 23. November 2004.
H, P M. (2006), „Schweizerische Geldpolitik“, Speech for the 
Mitgliederversammlung des Vereins IFZ (Institut für Finanzdienstleistungen 
Zug), Zug, 1. Juni 2006.
I, O (2004), “Inflation Targeting: A View from the ECB”, Federal 
Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review, 86 (4), pp. 169–179.
J, T J. (2007a), „Kommunikation, Transparenz und Geldpolitik“, 
Referat vor der Vereinigung Basler Ökonomen, Basel, 24. Mai 2007.
J, T J. (2007b), „Wie hat sich das geldpolitische Konzept der SNB 
bewährt?“, Speech for the Vereinigung Berner Wirtschaftswissenschafter, 
VBW, 27. Februar 2007, Bern.
 J / P / R
J, T J. (2008a), „Geldpolitik und Unsicherheit“, Speech at the Uni-
versity of Freiburg im Breisgau, January 15.
J, T J. (2008b), “Discussion of ‘Monetary Policy Inclinations’ by 
Hans Gersbach and Volker Hahn”, Swiss National Bank Research Confer-
ence 2008.
J, T J. and M P (2007), “The Path to Interest Rate 
Management and Inflation Forecasts”, in: The Swiss National Bank 1907–
2007, pp. 255–272, NZZ Libor.
J, T J. and E R (2009), “Transparency and Communica-
tion of the Swiss National Bank”, Mimeo, Swiss National Bank.
J, T J., M P and G R (2001), “The Role 
of M3 in the Policy Analysis of the Swiss National Bank”, in: Hans-Joachim 
Klöckers and Caroline Willeke (eds), Monetary Analysis: Tools and Applica-
tions, pp. 47–62, European Central Bank.
J, T J., A R, and P S (2009), “The 
Implementation of SNB Monetary Policy”, Financial Markets & Portfolio 
Management, 23, pp. 349–359.
K, D (2009), “Price-Setting Behaviour in Switzerland: Evidence 
from CPI Micro Data”, Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics, 145 (3), 
pp. 293–349.
K, M (1997), “Changes in UK Monetary Policy: Rules and Discretion 
in Practice”, Journal of Monetary Economics, 39, pp. 87–97.
K, U (2008), “Is ‘Inflation Targeting’ Passé?”, paper prepared for the 
conference The New International Monetary System in the honor of Alexander 
Swoboda on the occasion of his retirement, International Center for Monetary 
and Banking Studies and Graduate Institute of International and Develop-
ment Studies, Geneva, May 30.
K, K N. (2004), “The Role of Policy Rules in Inflation Target-
ing”, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review, pp. 89–111.
M, D (2007), “Central Bank Communication Hits Diminishing Mar-
ginal Returns”, JPMorgan Research, May 11.
M, F S. (2007), “Inflation Targeting: True Progress or Repack-
aging of an Old Idea?”, in: The Swiss National Bank 1907–2007, pp. 599–
623, NZZ Libor.
M, F S. (2008), “Monetary Policy Flexibility, Risk Management, 
and Financial Disruptions”, Speech at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 
January 11.
P, M (2007), “The Money Supply as an Intermediate Monetary 
Target”, in: The Swiss National Bank 1907–2007, pp. 236–254, NZZ Libro.
Ten Years’ Experience with the Swiss National Bank’s Monetary Policy Strategy 
P, M, and M S (eds) (2010), “The Swiss National 
Bank’s Suite of Inflation Forecasting Models”, Swiss National Bank Economic 
Study No.7 2010.
R, A, and E R (2010), “The Reaction of Asset Markets to 
Swiss National Bank Communication”, Journal of International Money and 
Finance, 29, pp. 486–503.
R, G (1997), “Monetary Targets as a Policy Rule: Lessons from the Swiss 
Experience”, Journal of Monetary Economics, 39, pp. 113–141.
R, G (2000), “Monetary Policy without Central Bank Money: A Swiss 
Perspective”, International Finance, 3 (3), pp. 439–69.
R, G (2007), “Swiss Monetary Targeting 1974–1996: The Role of 
Internal Policy Analysis”, Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics, 143 (3), 
pp. 283–329.
R, J-P (2002), „Ist eine Notenbank für Überraschungen gut?“, 
speech for the Statistisch-Volkswirtschaftliche Gesellschaft Basel, Montag, 
25. März 2002.
R, J-P (2003), „Geldpolitische Standortbestimmung“, speech for 
the Volkswirtschaftliche Gesellschaft des Kantons Bern, Montag, 17. März 
2003.
R, J-P (2006), „Geldpolitik 2000–2005: Was haben wir gelernt?“, 
speech at the Universität St. Gallen, 18. Januar 2006.
R, J-P (2007), «Stratégie de politique monétaire – Expériences 
récentes en Suisse», Séminaire de théorie et politique monétaires, speech at 
the Université de Fribourg, 28 novembre 2007.
R, E and M S (2002), “How Accurate are GDP Fore-
casts? An Empirical Study for Switzerland”, Swiss National Bank Quarterly 
Bulletin, 3, pp. 42–63.
S, M R. and M G (2010), “The Performance of SNB 
Inflation Forecasts from 2000 to 2009 – A Proposal to Evaluate Conditional 
Inflation Forecasts. Comments on ‘Swiss Monetary Policy 2000–2009’ by 
Hans Genberg and Stefan Gerlach”, Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics, 
146, 1, pp. 167–183.
S, M (2009), “Implementation of Monetary Policy and the Money 
Market”, Dissertation, Universität Basel.
S, L E.O. (1999), “Inflation Targeting as a Monetary Policy Rule”, 
Journal of Monetary Economics, 43, pp. 607–654.
S, L E.O. (2000), “Open-Economy Inflation Targeting”, Journal of 
International Economics, 50, pp. 155–183.
 J / P / R
S, L E.O. (2006), “Optimal inflation Targeting: Further Develop-
ments of Inflation Targeting”, Banco Central de Chile Documentos de Tra-
bajo No 403, Diciembre.
T, J B. (1993), “Discretion versus Policy Rules in Practice”, Carnegie-
Rochester Conference Series on public Policy, 39, pp. 195–214.
T, E M. (2003), Inflation Targeting in the World Economy, Institute 
for International Economics, Washington, DC.
W, M (2003), Interest and Prices: Foundations of a Theory of 
Monetary Policy, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
SUMMARY
In December 1999 the Swiss National Bank (SNB) abandoned monetary tar-
geting and introduced a new monetary policy strategy. The cornerstones of the 
new framework are an explicit definition of what the SNB considers to be price 
stability, a forecast of inflation over a three-year horizon, and a target range for 
the three-month Swiss franc Libor. The strategy lived up to expectations in every 
respect and contributed to strengthening the SNB’s credibility. In particular, the 
new framework’s flexibility proved successful in times of financial stress. The 
term reference interest rate contains an automatic monetary stabilizer that has 
insulated the nonfinancial sector from much of the turbulence. The major chal-
lenge lying ahead is sustained accuracy in the assessment of future inflation.
